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THEATER FORCES

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SOMMER CRITICIZES PENTAGON'S NUCLEAR WAR PLANS

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 20 Aug 82 p 1

[Article by Theo Sommer]

[Text] Since the beginning of August the American President has had under consideration a study by the Pentagon which will inevitably cause new unrest in Western Europe. The draft of an "overall strategic plan" boils down to putting the United States in a position to conduct and win a long atomic war against the Soviets--up to 6 months, according to newspaper reports. This new atomic planning, if it were actually adopted by Reagan, takes the breath away, and not only from opponents of nuclear weapons.

Granted, America's defense policy remains expressly oriented toward defense in the event of an attack. Granted further, "strategic planning for counterattack is not provocative" (according to the annual report for 1982 of the American secretary of defense). Also granted, finally, it is part of the paradox of the deterrence concept that the ability to fight in itself is a guarantee of not having to fight.

The new plans of the Pentagon, however, go far beyond that. In place of the war-prevention strategy followed up to now, they appear to set forth a warmaking strategy and a nuclear one at that. This presumption becomes almost a certainty if one takes into account the simultaneous expansion of U.S. civil defense: \$4.2 billion is, for one thing, being provided for precautionary arrangements whereby 150 million Americans could be evacuated in an emergency from the vicinity of 63 important military establishments, 330 other military and industrial sites and from all cities having more than 50,000 inhabitants to open country. Many military people believe that an atomic war could be won; the civil defense authorities claim, with bureaucratic candor, that the population could survive such a war. Both make a nuclear war more likely.

This American fooling around with plans touches on the security interests of Western Europe--especially the FRG--in three respects.

First, the idea of a "long-drawn-out war" is bound to make us shudder whether it is waged conventionally or with nuclear weapons. The alternating waves of attack and defense would lay waste to our land and threaten our national substance: starting with the deployment of modern conventional weapons (as

in Beirut); then more seriously with the use of nuclear weapons. In the interest of our survival, Western strategy must be directed toward the search for a quick decision: theoretically whether to escalate, negotiate a cease-fire, or capitulate. We should hardly have more than 3 to 10 days for that decision.

Secondly, the lavish use of nuclear weapons is impossible in thickly populated Europe. As long as selective, demonstrative, targeted single strikes represent only the short step to the great retaliatory potential of America, this may serve to deter Moscow and unite Europe and North America. If, however, long phases of tactical nuclear warfare in Europe without using the big stick are being contemplated, this would mean the uncoupling of Europe.

Thirdly it is a suicidal concept to think that nuclear war could be simultaneously controlled, administered in doses, waged on a limited basis and finally won. John F. Kennedy's statement still applies: "The victory would turn to ashes in our mouths." The uncertainties of nuclear war are great, its dynamic incalculable. Nuclear weapons must remain political weapons: they are not patented weapons to be used in any situation. The theory of nuclear deterrence may not be transformed in practice to the waging of nuclear warfare; to think the unthinkable must not be allowed to entice us to plan it.

The Reagan administration came to power 18 months ago with a rather extreme defense policy mindset, especially with the idea that atomic wars could be limited, waged and won. Then for a while, after the allies made their lack of understanding and disfavor known, the Reagan administration held back. But now they are trying again to fashion concepts of how the United States could in the end "prevail" in a long, continuing nuclear conflict. They do not want just to deny victory to the opponent, they want to gain victory themselves. They fling to the winds the warning that in that case the survivors would envy the dead.

This is grist for the mills not only of the European peace movement--which has been gathering strength since Reagan deigned under much pressure to conduct disarmament negotiation with the Soviets. It will also cause new tensions at government level in the Atlantic alliance. It is unacceptable to the Europeans to have NATO military doctrine simply imposed on them by Washington.

9827
CSO: 3103/649

TERRORISM

SPAIN

ETA ATTACKS BANKERS TO UNDERMINE BASQUE ECONOMY

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 27 Aug 82 pp 4, 5

[Article by Alberto Anaut: "ETA Attacks Banking Sector"]

[Text] In February, the terrorist organization ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] decided on a new strategy, breaking the cease-fire with the banking sector. Since June, the Banco de Vizcaya, the Banco de Santander and several others have been subjected to the poundings of Goma-2 [plastic explosive] for refusing to pay the "revolutionary tax." The ETA has gone so far as to demand of one of the mentioned banks the sum of 250 million pesetas. Last Wednesday, a bomb left in the doorway of a branch office killed two Civil Guardsmen who attempted to deactivate it. The ETA's declaration of war against the banking sector places a bomb at the very foundation of the economy.

Madrid--On Wednesday 24 August, at 3 a.m., two Civil Guardsmen were blown to bits by an ETA bomb as they removed a suspicious bag that had been placed in front of the subsidiary of a bank in Munguia, Vizcaya. One kilogram of Goma-2 destroyed their lives, shattered the banking establishment and seriously damaged other buildings around it. This is not the first case in which the ETA's objective has gone amiss and caused unexpected victims. On 26 June, the bag of Goma-2 that had been prepared against Iberduero in Renteria exploded in full under the body of Alberto Munagorri.

Nor is it the first time the ETA has set out to attack the banking sector. In February, the terrorists decided on total war and have since penetrated two sanctuaries that have heretofore not been subjected directly to their fury: Since 5 June, the Church and the banking sector have also become targets. Of a different degree of force, but of threats nevertheless.

On 13 April, A letter addressed by the ETA to various banking establishments lit the fuse. In it, the "milis" demanded payment of the "revolutionary tax" by the enterprises that have the most money in this country. The exact sums are not known, but there is talk of some 250 million pesetas in some cases.

The letter caused surprise. Two banks--Santander and Vizcaya--flatly refused to pay. On 9 June, in a public demand appearing, of course in the pages of EGIN, the ETA threatened the assets and the persons of the managements of these two banks.

Other cases are not known publicly. It is not known whether other banks received the same letter and decided to pay in exchange for security, because the ETA never reveals the names of those who support it economically. There are however loose facts lying about that clearly indicate a state of serious concern in the banking sector.

The Banco de Bilbao has been subjected to various pressures that have placed its Board of Directors with their backs to the wall. The Banco de Bilbao's strongman, Emilio Ybarra, affirms that he walks the streets without official protection, but the fact is that the bank has, over a period of several months, been severely attacked in the pages of EGIN on alleged irregularities that are claimed to have occurred during Claudio Boada's tenure with the steel exporting company. References to the flight of capital were also injected. The use of "dossiers" as blackmail has clearly been the order of the day.

The only certain fact is that the air one breathes in the Bank of Bilbao now is more serene. And another fact: Notwithstanding that, officially, nothing has changed at the Bank of Bilbao, the bank's management is spending increasingly more time at the bank's new building in the Azca complex in Madrid, to which various services--research, public relations, international operations...--have been formally transferred, and where the Bank of Bilbao is trying to project more of a national image.

Aguirre Gonzalo--president of BANESTO, Spain's second national bank and until recently the leader of the seven top-ranking large ones, and owner of the Banco Guipuzcoano--has not neglected the situation of his bank in the Basque Region, and, since May, there has been a notable increase in the Banco Guipuzcoano's security measures in the Basque provinces. Other large banks have opted for the same approach. The Banco Hispano Americano also received word from the terrorists toward the end of July.

First Warning

On 5 June, in Begona, youths of the Herri Batasuna (Jarrai) interrupted with shouts of "Gora ETA militar" a rally of the youths of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party], with Monsignor Uriarte at their head. The ETA's response to the "sermon for peace" of the Basque bishops was immediate. The first sanctuary was ruptured.

The following morning, bombs exploded at each of the subsidiaries of the Banco de Vizcaya and the Bank of Santander in the Gros district in San Sebastian. The second sanctuary was now ruptured. The ETA had given notice in writing: "All persons and assets, threatened."

At Banco de Vizcaya's head office, on Bilbao's Gran Via, the security measures cannot be characterized as very stringent. They are far below international norms. Some members of the Employees Committee undertook to boycott them when the management decided for a confrontation with the terrorist threat. A substantial number of workers, following orders, attempted to completely paralyze the security controls, by arriving en masse at the bank carrying large bags containing old newspapers, with the intent of compelling the security services to carry out detailed searches and thus disrupt the reporting for work.

The management's floor has enhanced controls. Some doors into its office area are operated by remote controls located on other floors. Nevertheless, and despite the closed television circuit, one cannot talk in terms of a detailed security plan. All of the banking sector operates in the same manner.

The banking sector expected the ETA phenomenon but was ingenuous. There were no plans for responding to a possible attack, nor did the sector react with firmness or submit to public opinion its reasons for resisting the payment of the "revolutionary tax." Some top managements even prefer silence to confronting terrorism publicly. When Jose Angel Sanchez Asiain, president of the Banco de Bilbao, tried to address the issue at a meeting of the Spanish Bankers Association--the authentic club of the sector's big bankers--the president of another bank cut him off swiftly, saying that these were private matters. That is the situation. The banking sector does not have a common plan of action against the ETA. Many bankers have decided to fight alone against the terrorist offensive, not realizing that this new ETA strategy is neither a mere coincidence nor a minor step-up.

Those having special knowledge of the sector and officials responsible for anti-terrorist operations convey the impression that either the ETA is desperately in need of money, at whatever cost, to buy ever more sophisticated weapons--such as rifles with telescopic sights like the one that was used on 13 December last year against a Civil Guardsman from the Monte de los Capuchinos in Pasajes--or, on the contrary, that the ETA feels so entrenched that it need no longer fear the banking sector or the Church.

The message sent to some of the threatened banks wasted no words: "Do not worry; for the moment, only material damages will be done to the branch offices." This calmative note is false. Two days ago, besides causing damage valued at 700,000 pesetas to the most recently attacked branch office--of the Banco de Vizcaya in this case--surrounding structures were destroyed and two Civil Guardsmen were assassinated.

Deadly Strategy

The management staffs of the banks involved feel threatened. No photos. No private telephones. A heavy bodyguard. Beware of regular habits. Families, in many cases, transferred to Madrid.

And more. Costly control measures to spot infiltrators. Guaranties of banking secrecy. Heavy pressure from those who have succeeded in infiltrating and are watching and waiting for the slightest slip-up, to pounce on the enterprise.

The Basque banks and enterprises are witnessing the spectacle of the ETA dismembering the Basque economy, while it launches alternatives. In its manifesto titled "ETA Military Section's Communique to the Basque Working People," the "milis" launched a very real economic program that would be the basis for the development of its future state of terror: A resort to foreign cash and investments. They do not specify, of course, where these hypothetical investors would be coming from, perhaps so as not to bring into view the fact that the Soviet economy in its current crisis barely yields enough to support the regime imposed by Jaruzelski in Poland, and that in Albania, as of today, no one is investing. There are no more Red paradises.

Meanwhile, there are some contradictory aspects of this ETA economic strategy: The campaign being waged by all the Batasuna-controlled city councils against PETRONOR, the call to shut down Lemoniz and continue paying its 2,000 workers, and the fact that SEFANITRO should prefer to invest its 3,000 million pesetas in Yugoslavia than in Bilbao.

Then there is the extension of the "revolutionary tax," which increasingly affects more of the population strata. No one feels secure. Many scions of well-to-do families maintain passive memberships in Herri Batasuna, solely as a security hedge. More than one enterprise has financed Herri Batasuna activities. This is the case of the "revolutionary tax," which brings in as much on a "retail" level--as was recently reported by Ander Landaburu in CAMBIO 16--as it now does, in the case of the banking establishment, on a "wholesale" level.

Of all the threatened banks--Vizcaya, Santander, Guipuzcoano and, according to the latest information, Hispano-Americano--the Banco de Vizcaya, headed by Galindez y Toledo, is taking the brunt of the ETA attacks. The terrorist strategy cannot condone the fact that this entity has resolved its problems of some years back and is now doing a prosperous business, with one of the best balance sheets of results in the banking sector, brought out of the red by good management--precisely the opposite of what the terrorists want to see.

Basque businessmen are talking about it. The ETA militants who have infiltrated among the workers have no qualms about acknowledging publicly that their object is to sink enterprises, one by one. They have asserted this to the businessmen themselves--to their very faces. In this manner, they are sowing chaos. The flat refusal by the Banco de Vizcaya's strongmen to pay the "revolutionary tax" is the new target of terrorism.

The ETA has started its attack on a moderate scale, blowing up some of the banking sector's branch offices. But it will not stop there. The top managements of the banks have the "tax" blackmail hanging over them and they know they are in

danger. However, they are not the only ones. The Basque society as a whole is being subjected to extortion. No one is escaping it. With the kidnapping of Allende, it has come to light that a large number of the odontologists have been contributing between 1 and 3 million pesetas a year to the ETA. Others not as well off are paying on monthly installments. Now, addressing itself to the banking sector--first the Banco de Vizcaya, then, later, all the rest--the ETA is seeking to make a major advance. It is aiming at the heart of the economic system.

9399
CSO: 3110/228

TERRORISM

SPAIN

ETA'S INTIMIDATION OF BASQUE BANKERS WIDESPREAD

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 30 Aug 82 p 6

[Article by Alberto Anaut: "The Banks, Divided in the Face of the ETA Threat"]

[Text] ETA's [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] attack on various banks (demanding payment of the revolutionary tax under threat to their high-ranking officials and to the entities' assets) has divided the banks. As opposed to those who favor not making the same mistake as the electric companies, which left Iberduero burdened alone with the "death" of Lemoniz, and which now observe the nuclear challenge placed upon them, other sectors insist that individual problems are involved. Meanwhile, alleged names of banks that would pay ETA are beginning to circulate, although these reports which have been gathered lack reliability to date.

Madrid--The publication in Friday's edition of DIARIO 16 of the report that the ETA terrorist organization has demanded payment of large sums as a revolutionary tax, and has threatened the board members and assets of some of the country's leading banks, has caused agitation in the financial world, which had been holding calm discussions, taking advantage of the last opportunities of the vacation season.

All the sources questioned by DIARIO 16 (some of whom were familiar with the ins and outs of the ETA blackmail, although they kept the secret carefully) agree in citing the seriousness of the situation, because it essentially entails the taking of another step on the part of ETA.

Internal Controversy

Up until now, except for occasional skirmishes, the terrorists had respected the financial world, with a position that was interpreted as being circumspect, as part of the irrationality of the ETA plans. It gave the impression that the terrorists did not want to open up too many direct war fronts; and that precaution has just been ended.

In banking circles, the controversy is overt. In opposition to those who favor acting as if this were an individual problem affecting certain institutions, another group of banks favors a joint undertaking of the strategy to be pursued, with the interpretation that, "This is an overall problem, wherein the only thing that remains to be established is the order in which each one of us is going to fall."

The division is not clearcut, and unanimous positions are not even upheld by the various financial establishments.

This newspaper has received reports of the existence of forceful internal discussions of the strategy to be followed, from which, at least thus far, the Spanish Banking Association has remained aloof. The attempts at discussion have been quickly aborted, even by some of the banks affected.

On the personal level, there is fear of ETA. However, that is not the exclusive attribute of the banks, but rather a situation that has become increasingly widespread in the Basque Country. Despite the caution and the normal security measures which ordinarily surround the financial world, there have been several instances of board members receiving telephone threats recently. A general manager of one of the large banks, with a usual residence in Madrid, recently had to leave his summer place in the Basque Country, in view of the constant threats against him and his family received by telephone.

Is Anyone Paying?

However, the essential matter lies not only in establishing the list of entities threatened for refusing to pay the revolutionary tax, but also in learning for certain whether any other entity has made a deal with ETA.

The argument about the payment of the revolutionary tax is common topic of conversation in the Basque business world, which is experiencing the problem as a whole. In the case of the banks, however, the issue assumes special features, because one of the business' typical features lies in security.

The fact is that there is no information to the effect that any bank is paying, although the world of rumor has almost a complete list, with given names and surnames. It is not reliable, and there is every indication that it could have been drawn up more on the basis of attempts than stringent data. There has even been talk (a point which this newspaper has not been able to ascertain thus far) to the effect that a name appeared in writing, in the international process.

Among those who advocate that the banks adopt a common strategy against the tax, there is the impression that, with the present vacillation, there might be fostered the second part of what has been called the "Lemoniz error."

Iberduero has had to struggle alone for a long time (and certainly without too much success in many instances) against the besiegement of Lemoniz; while other electric companies dissociated themselves from the matter, noting that, "It is a problem of the bad image that the company had in the Basque Country beforehand."

Today, the situation has changed and, after the problems which arose with the Asco nuclear powerplants and, in particular, Almaraz, one cannot find any electric company involved in the nuclear business which is not frightened by the popular challenge, and making an examination of conscience regarding its public relations service.

Policy Error

To date, the banks (absorbed in the stiff competition under way among the banks to take over the market) have never made joint plans of action relating to their image. The greatest attempt, which took place a few years ago, was carried out by Rafael Anson's firm, and it was finally scrapped because it was impossible for the big banks to reach agreement when it came time to explain the virtues of their business to the citizen. A poll taken by Sofemasa concerning what Spaniards thought of various banks was used by the different banks involved to quarrel with each other, rather than to make a collective assessment of their image.

Now, the threat from ETA (first, Vizcaya, Santander, Guipuzcoan and Hispano, and tomorrow others) has again caught the banks disunited; although, on this occasion, voices are rising up to explain the need for joint action.

2909

CSO: 3110/234

DENMARK TO SELL TWICE AS MUCH GAS TO SWEDEN AS FIRST AGREED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 28 Aug 82 p 8

[Article by Thomas Jonsson]

[Text] Copenhagen, Friday--Beginning in 1986, Swedegas will be able to purchase between 450 and 500 million cubic meters of Danish natural gas per year--almost twice as much as the import quantity previously agreed on between Swedegas and Denmark's state-owned petroleum and natural gas firm DONG [Danish Oil and Natural Gas].

The negotiations between Swedegas and DONG are almost complete, according to what DAGENS NYHETER was told by Danish Minister of Energy Poul Nielson. The draft agreement resulting from the negotiations was approved by DONG's management on Thursday.

Nielson says: "Our gas will be exported at a price acceptable to both parties. But that price is not the same as it was under the previous agreement between Swedegas and DONG."

Sweden's Swedegas, which is partly state owned, concluded an agreement with DONG in 1979 for the purchase of 200 million cubic meters of natural gas per year.

Deliveries--chiefly to several municipalities in Skane--will begin in 1986. But even when that agreement was being worked out, Swedegas wanted to buy up to 500 million cubic meters of gas per year from the Danish North Sea fields.

The new agreement provides for Swedish purchases of at least 440 million cubic meters annually for at least 6 years. Swedegas is also entitled to negotiate for further purchases of Danish natural gas ahead of any possible foreign gas customers.

The Danish minister of energy says: "But larger export quantities than those Swedegas is now entitled to buy would require that we ourselves buy more North Sea gas than we had planned."

Through DONG, the Danish Government has signed contracts with the privately owned Danish Underground Consortium (DUC) for the delivery of 2.5 billion cubic

meters of natural gas annually from the North Sea. The gas will come on stream in 1984.

Coal Firing

Swedegas is able to buy more Danish gas for two reasons:

First, heat consumption in Denmark is 30 percent below the level expected when forecasts for the gas projects were drawn up in 1979.

Second, Danish power plants and district heating plants have to a large extent converted to coal in recent years. Coal is so cheap that gas cannot yet compete in price.

DONG declined to comment on how much Swedegas will have to pay for its gas imports, which have now been doubled at a single stroke. It confirmed the statement by the minister of energy, but declined to go into detail, since the parties are still "in the final stage of negotiation."

11798
CSO: 3109/230

GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY TURNING TO ALTERNATIVE SOURCES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Sep 82 p 7

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Big heat pumps will be heating several larger cities in Sweden just 2 or 3 years from now. The parliamentary decision to phase out nuclear power by 2010 and to reduce dependency on oil led up to this. Swedish industry is already working on several projects and the emphasis on heat pumps will increase employment. But we will have to wait until around 1990 before peat and wood chips can play a sizable role as alternative energy sources.

In the spring of 1981, Riksdag approved energy production guidelines, following heated discussions in the election campaigns of both 1976 and 1979.

According to the decision, nuclear power will be phased out by 2010 and the emphasis will be placed instead on renewable energy sources that will be used to replace imported energy, primarily oil.

The municipalities are responsible for heating homes and offices, but the decision made by the parties in Riksdag means a great deal with regard to the development of the energy sector.

The parties currently making up the government have expressed support for heating Stockholm by means of heat pumps, among other things. The Social Democrats are also moving in this direction, since the warm water tunnel from Forsmark was rejected.

In its program, "Save Jobs," the Liberal Party estimated that an expanded heat pump system in Stockholm would involve 10 billion kronor in investments and a total of 50,000 work years.

Provide More Energy

Heat pumps are also topics of current interest in other big cities. Goteborg has indicated its approval of heat pumps, as has Lidingo.

In Vasteras and Ludvika, a 10 megawatt heat pump was installed and the Stockholm Energy Department is installing a heat pump at the Henriksdal sewage treatment plant to make use of the heat in the waste water.

MoDo is also installing heat pumps in its industry in order to sell heat to Ornskoldsvik.

Heat pumps are not an alternative energy source. A heat pump is a device that takes up heat from a heat source, such as air or water, and gives off heat at a higher temperature. A heat pump normally transforms one energy unit into three energy units.

The most common heat pumps are the 10 megawatt size. This means that it would take 100 heat pumps to produce as much energy as the biggest nuclear power plant, Oskarshamn 3. A third of the energy will go to operate the heat pumps. Through the nuclear power plants, Sweden will have a surplus of electricity that can run the heat pumps.

Wood and Peat

Swedish industry is very advanced in the heat pump area, with the most prominent firms being Stal-Laval in Finspang, Gotaverken in Goteborg and Stal Refrigeration, Inc. in Norrkoping.

Wood energy and peat are two alternative energy sources that can be used now with familiar techniques, but the technology needs to be further developed.

By 1990 the utilization of wood energy should produce 25-30 Twh. At present, 45 million cubic meters of wood is left in the forest in the form of roots, branches and wood left from forest clearing projects.

Many systems are being tested for the efficient utilization of wood scraps. The Mora Heating Plant is building a facility for firing with refuse and wood fuel. Lovholmens factory in Pitea is putting in a furnace that will burn wood and peat.

Sweden has had poor experiences with firing with peat. Some 5.4 million hectares of Sweden's surface consist of peat bogs. Two peat-fired facilities have been put in operation at Lovholmen and at the Skelleftea power plant. There are plans for such facilities in Umea, Gallivare and Boden.

The use of coal will increase from 4.5 to 34-44 Twh, but the spring session of parliament could not agree on guidelines to regulate sulfur emission.

In Eskilstuna they are planning a coal-fired power and heating plant, in Oxelosund a coal condensation power plant and Vasteras is planning a large-scale use of coal in a power and heating plant.

Southern Power has started to plan a coal condensation power plant in Landskrona and Sodertalje municipality will set up a coal-fired heating plant at Igelsta.

Wind and Sun

It will not be possible to determine the role that will be played by windpower as an alternative energy source before the mid-1990's.

Two prototypes are being put up at Nasudden on Gotland and in Maglarp in Skane. It takes around 100 windpower plants to obtain 1 Twh.

On the solar side, solar collector systems to heat tap water and swimming pools are the most immediate prospect. The Sodertorn district heating system is building a large solar collector facility in Sodertorn and Sodertalje municipality is erecting a solar collector for the purpose of heating 500 apartments.

In the spring of 1980 parliament took a stand on natural gas deliveries from Denmark to Sweden. The government recently gave Swedegas permission to run a pipeline from the territorial water boundary to Klagstorp, south of Malmo. The cost will be 135 million kronor.

At the same time, plans are being made for a pipeline to transport natural gas from North Norway through Sweden to the continent. Preliminary estimates put investment costs for this at 20 billion kronor.

6578
CSO: 3109/233

GOVERNMENT SUBMITS BUDGET BILL TO PARLIAMENT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 31 Aug 82 p 9

[Article: "Government Agrees on Budget in 4 Days; Social Benefits Partially Cut, Loan Total Swells by 200 Million"]

[Text] The government has withdrawn some of those social benefit cuts the Finance Ministry had proposed from next year's national income and expenditures budget. Illness and maternity benefits will be reduced next year only for those with a monthly income of over 6,000 marks.

The government has left retirement and social security pension rate hikes as they were before and health center payments will not be resumed, as the Finance Ministry had hoped they would be.

During discussions lasting 4 days, the budget proposal swelled by a half a billion: The final amount rose from 71.6 billion marks to 72.1 billion. The government succeeded in adjusting additional expenditures so that taxes and fees would not be raised any more than planned. On the other hand, the loan total was raised by 200 million marks, that is, to 8.95 billion marks.

The government decided to handle the embarrassing social benefit matters so that benefits for illness and maternity will continue to remain at 80 percent, but at only a 50-percent benefit for those with a monthly income of over 6,000 marks. The 50-percent rule applies to that portion of the monthly income that exceeds 6,000 marks. If, for example, one's monthly sick leave income is 10,000 marks figured the way the law provides, one's benefit is 80 percent of 6,000 marks plus 50 percent of 4,000 marks. The monthly gross figure is 1,200 marks less than at present, but the difference in the cash benefit one receives is not that big because the benefit is taxed.

SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] ministers were of the opinion that a sociopolitical improvement has now been made in benefits.

The government wants to postpone the increase in maternity benefits scheduled for next April until the beginning of 1984. The increase will affect the last half of maternity leave benefits, which is at present calculated at 70 percent of daily income. Benefits should be raised to the level of the first half, or 80 percent.

Eight Percent for Child Subsidy

An 8-percent increase in child subsidies has been promised, but not before early October 1983. The maternity benefit will rise by 25 marks to a total of 440 marks. The daily allowance for conscripts will rise by 1 mark in early October and those who have served in the Army for 330 days will be eligible for one more free vacation trip. Scholarship grants will rise by from 100 to 300 marks, depending on the educational institution.

Support for home care of children will also be extended, since an additional 68 million will be appropriated for that purpose. Minister of Social Affairs Marjatta Vaananen (Center Party) got the amount increased by 20 million during the negotiations.

Tax Reforms in February

Next year income and property taxes will be adjusted by 9 percent, as the Finance Ministry has proposed. The main deductions will at the same time be increased by 1 percent and deductions for children by slightly more than that.

The adjustments made in the tax tables will not, however, be applied to withholding taxes right away at the start of the year as was thought, rather not until the beginning of February. This year the new tables were first applied at the beginning of March.

The government will maintain the business turnover tax at 14 percent, as before. Business turnover tax relief provisions for industry will also be the same as before. The Finance Ministry would have preferred to increase them slightly.

They plan to arrange for a special tax deduction for research for businesses and they are promising farmers the long-needed investment clause.

Diesel Cars Will Be More Expensive

Tobacco and liquor prices will be raised by 5 percent at the beginning of next year and gasoline will also be proportionately as much more expensive since the fuel tax will be raised. The motor vehicle tax will also rise and that will mean greater expense for diesel cars.

The so-called tax on industrial raw material electricity will drop to half of what it is but otherwise the tax on electric power will remain the same as before. The revenue tax on real estate sales will be reduced a little but the revenue tax on promissory notes with terms of over 9 months will go up to 1.2 percent.

The government will raise rail ticket prices by 5 percent at the beginning of the year and again by the same percentage at the beginning of July. At the beginning of the year freight rates will go up 5 percent and 7 percent again in July.

Post Office and Telecommunications charges will also rise at the beginning of the year. They have been planning to raise postal charges by fully 11 or 12 percent.

There will be a 5-percent hike on air traffic and channel fees as well as on inspection fees and driver's licenses will become proportionately at least that costly too.

At the beginning of the year a new deep-water fishing fee will be imposed and fishing licenses will be changed to personally identify the bearer. A fishing license, a game protection tax, will be raised to 60 marks.

Taxes on Employers Change

Next year there will be many changes in taxes on employers. Employers' health insurance tax will go up from the current 1.9 percent to 2.35 percent and the unemployment insurance tax from 0.4 percent to 0.7 percent. In return, employers' retirement pension tax will drop from 12.4 percent to 11.6 percent.

By means of such arrangements, money from the retirement pension fund will, as it were, be transferred to the health insurance fund which has incurred a big deficit. Retirement pension establishments will get 300 million marks less than expected, but this will not interfere with the payment of pensions.

Wage earners' social security and health insurance payments will remain unchanged.

Environment Ministry in October

The creation of an environment ministry is still such a troublesome business that the government has been unable to decide on anything concerning it other than that the ministry will be established at the beginning of October 1983. Not so much as a penny has been earmarked for the establishment of the new ministry in the budget; instead, funding will be decided on through a supplementary budget following the spring parliamentary elections.

Foreign Trade Minister Esko Rekola (independent) engineered the decision on the environment ministry during budget negotiations and the decision was carried by Rekola and the center parties' votes. The Left moved that a ministry based on a so-called broad model be created now in connection with the regular budget.

The Left further plans to make a motion on the matter in Parliament.

In addition to an environment ministry, a technological development center, which will be the same kind of establishment as the Travel Promotion Center, is to be created as part of the national administration next year.

900 Million to Developing Countries

During the 4 days of negotiations, development cooperation funds were increased from 846 million to over 900 million marks. This figure is 0.37 percent of the GNP.

During the negotiations, housing appropriations were increased by 1,000 units and the Communists were appeased by further reducing Army procurement funds by about 10 million. The total, nevertheless, remained at over a billion marks.

During the negotiations, Agriculture Minister Taisto Tahkamaa (Center Party) managed to squeeze an additional 10 million out of them for the farm fund, with the total growing to 670 million, and the education ministers eased 26 more college positions out of them than the Finance Ministry had proposed.

Construction on the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation's first coastal channel broadcasting station, promoted by the RKP [Swedish People's Party], will begin next year and 10 electric locomotives will be ordered from the Soviet Union. Communications Minister Jarmo Wahlstrom (Communist) would have preferred to have 15 locomotives.

The government will submit the budget bill to Parliament on Friday, 17 September, at which time the entire text will also be published.

11,466
CSO: 3107/178

LABOR UNION SEEKING PACT WITH SHORTER HOURS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 31 Aug 82 p 12

[Article by Bo A. Ericsson]

[Text] Over half a million people are currently out of work in the Scandinavian countries. Nothing seems to help keep the situation from growing worse. This has led the Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions [SAK], following the example of Denmark's LO [Federation of Trade Unions] earlier this year, to reconsider an important issue: the length of the workweek.

Helsinki, Monday--A shortening of the workweek so that more people can have jobs will be a major demand by Finland's SAK in this fall's wage negotiations. The situation on the labor market will be so difficult over the next few years that new remedies must be considered now in order to save jobs, says the SAK's leadership.

Even Finnish Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa--a Social Democrat--has been indicating in recent statements that he no longer sees any alternative for insuring employment other than a redistribution of work--in other words, shorter working hours.

The fact that the SAK is now introducing the shorter workweek as a demand in the wage negotiations means that it has taken the same path that Denmark's LO had to choose earlier this year under the pressure of rising unemployment.

The Swedish LO, on the other hand, is sticking to its earlier position on the issue of working hours: according to Gunnar Nilsson and others, unemployment must be overcome by a more active economic policy, not by shorter working hours.

TCO Not Unsympathetic

The attitude within the TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees] is not that unsympathetic to the idea. On several occasions over the past 6 months, Lennart Bodstrom, the organization's chairman, has said that shorter working hours may become necessary if no other remedies help to reduce unemployment.

Outside Scandinavia, labor organizations in a number of West European countries have discussed or demanded shorter working hours for several years as a way of coping with the job problem. In France, President Mitterrand recently introduced the 39-hour workweek, and shorter hours have also been introduced in Belgium.

In Finland, about 140,000 people--or 5.6 percent--are completely unemployed. It is feared that unemployment may rise to 200,000 this winter.

DAGENS NYHETER was told by Per-Erik Lundh, the SAK's secretary: "The reason why we are now taking up the question of shorter working hours is that future economic growth will be too slow to provide employment.

"Annual growth of at least 2.5 or 3 percent is required just to maintain the present number of jobs. We will not be able to manage that. The result will be a faster increase in unemployment in the future. So it is now that we must consider new ways of solving the problems."

Cautious Beginning

How large a cut in working hours will be demanded by the SAK in this fall's wage negotiations--and how the cut will be worked out in practice--are questions currently being studied by a special task force. It is clear, however, that the move forward will be quite cautious in the beginning.

Discussion within the SAK concerning the financing aspect--which is the really crucial point--is not complete, either.

Lundh says: "But if we get a cutback in working hours that improves the employment situation, we will hold back on our wage demands. At least for the short term, that will mean a reduction in real wages."

In recent years, a number of studies have been carried out in West Europe to determine how much of an effect shorter working hours might have as far as new jobs are concerned, but they have not provided a clear-cut picture.

Lundh admits that it is hard to predict the effects--for one thing, it depends on the extent to which the employers will be able to "rationalize away" the reduction.

Lundh says: "But here in Finland, we already have a high rate of rationalization. So a shorter workweek will not necessarily speed up that pace any further."

Jobs Will Remain

Lundh also claims that the value of shorter working hours does not lie solely in the fact that new jobs might be created, but also in the fact that existing jobs that might otherwise be eliminated will be kept.

In his opinion, a shorter workweek's biggest effect will be felt in the public sector.

Lundh does not agree with the chairman of Sweden's LO, who says that shorter working hours would be a form of capitulation.

He says: "It is a matter of solidarity with the unemployed. One condition, however, is that we get a central bargaining agreement rather than agreements by union."

There is currently no enthusiasm within the Finnish employers' association for shorter working hours. For one thing, it is felt that it would be too expensive for the firms, and for another, there is said to be no proof that it would create new jobs.

Gloomy Forecast

A week or so ago, Finnish Minister of Labor Kajanoja--one of the Communists in the government--attracted a lot of attention by demanding a 38-hour workweek along with a vast government employment program.

It turned out, however, that the proposal was Kajanoja's own, not the government's, and that it may have been made as part of Kajanoja's efforts to create unity within his own party.

But at the same time, the job situation is regarded as so serious that the general expectation in Helsinki is that the government will have to come up with some form of employment package this fall.

In just the past few days, two or three more gloomy reports and forecasts have appeared. Among other things, they show--as DAGENS NYHETER reported earlier--that Finnish industry's ability to compete with foreign firms has deteriorated dramatically this year. And in the large and important metalworking industry, several years of steady growth have ended. It is even feared that there will be a drop in production next year.

11798
CSO: 3109/230

KOHL ON COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Aug 82 p 5

[Article by Johann Georg Reissmueller based on a conversation with opposition leader Helmut Kohl]

[Text] Back a week from his vacation on Lake Wolfgang, opposition leader Helmut Kohl sees the coalition in a decline which has accelerated dramatically since the summer recess. In a conversation with the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE newspaper he said that over half the citizens considered the government no longer capable of governing. The cause was easy to recognize: the SPD under Schmidt and Brandt had for years skirted clear decisions. It was for and against modernization of nuclear weapons, for and against nuclear power, for and against the social market economy. The FDP was sucked into the whirlpool of the SPD decline. It would have to tell the voters at its party congress in November at the latest what it wanted--whether it wanted to dare a "new beginning" or whether it wanted to let nature take its course. Moreover the FDP had to bear in mind that it had now been shoved into fourth place by the Greens and that large segments of the SPD wanted the Greens as a new partner.

But Kohl considers the situation in the FRG as more important than the conditions of the coalition parties. The opposition leader sees the FRG, 33 years after its establishment, in a critical phase. In this connection the economic difficulties could only be solved on a sure intellectual and moral foundation. The country had been living beyond its means. People were only demanding rights and no longer wanted to recognize obligations. Kohl sees the most striking example of this in defense where new burdens were unavoidable. The age-groups from years of low birth rates would make it necessary to prolong the term of military service and the excessive Soviet conventional weapons armament requires the FRG to spend more money on the Bundeswehr.

Charging free Time to Sick Leave is no Harmless Offense

"Lived beyond our means"--this key phrase was used repeatedly by Helmut Kohl. Future generations had been burdened with a mountain of national debt; it was immoral to continue to heap new billions on it. Instead the national debt must be reduced. Now Kohl is discussing the financial crisis. Anyone who wanted to overcome it would have to say frankly that our welfare level

today could not be financed indefinitely, in view of the declining growth rate. It was essential first of all to take measures against the misuse of the social network. The FRG had one of the best health care systems in the world but even so it had a level of sickness which was measurably affecting the productivity of our economy in comparison with foreign competition. "Any-one who takes off sick on many Mondays and Fridays at the expense of society is not committing a harmless offense," said Kohl. It was long past time to take on this deplorable state of affairs. The same applied to misuse of social aid and undesirable trends in the subsidy programs.

Moreover a plan for the reform of the structure of social expenditures was essential, all assets should be examined. Social justice and social peace could only be maintained if all collective safeguards against the risks of life were newly revised. The great majority of the citizens would be prepared for sacrifices to the extent that they could see only better prospects for the future. Kohl thinks it thoroughly worthwhile to consider the proposal to reduce all social expenditures and subventions across the board because it was essential to economize everywhere.

There had been encouraging examples recently of a sense of responsibility among the tariff partners. But to this praise he adds an urgent admonition addressed to the trade unions: talking about shortening the work week and lengthening annual vacation at this time was not promoting economic recovery. Both of these forms of shortening the work period had to be removed from the debate for the sake of reliable data on the scope of the economy. Furthermore even a reduction in the work lifespan could only be considered on a voluntary basis with reductions in pensions. The people had to be told that a lowering of the retirement age would not contribute much to the reduction of unemployment; in view of the decline in the birthrate the problems would be reversed: it would be a question of raising the retirement age even in this century.

But how is it going to be possible to get away from unemployment now? Kohl views the situation dramatically. The number of bankruptcies was growing by leaps and bounds. Hundreds of thousands of jobs in small business were being lost. Unemployment could only be overcome if we were to draw the consequences for today of our experience with the social market economy. The economy had to regain confidence. Tax, economy and finance policies had once again to be calculable for the entrepreneur. National economic policy had to promote a readiness to invest. The capital market had to be unburdened but it was also urgent to improve terms for enterprises with their own capital. For all of this, confidence building measures had to be taken by the state: it would have to establish reliable data on the scope of the economy and limit the burden of taxes. "At the small business level we need a wave of new jobs," the dynamic of the entire economy depended on that. Tax policy must no longer punish productivity. Today instead of investment incentives there were investment disincentives. Kohl recommends a precautionary energy policy; he considers it essential to build nuclear power plants. The new communications technology should be given free reign, the same for an increase in new housing construction; but in connection with the latter the landlord should have no fewer rights than the tenant.

Kohl speaks urgently and vigorously about all that. But he becomes passionate when the conversation turns to the situation of the family. The family had to return to the central point of society and state. An end had to be put to the dismantling of parental authority. Discrimination against families with many children had also to cease. The different financial situation made it impossible to do what was necessary for the time being. But first steps in the right direction had to be taken quickly. The discrediting of women as a mother had to disappear. The service of the mother in the family, "the most important service in society," could not, for example in social law, be burdened with disadvantages. The widespread youth cult seems to Kohl to be especially damaging to the family. In all advanced cultures of history high respect for the experience in life and wisdom of age had prevailed and it was so today in our east Asian partner Japan.

Amidst the domestic policy problems and objectives Kohl does not lose sight of the outside world. He is even afraid that the FRG is falling into a trend toward provincialization. "We cannot afford that." Peace was in danger, world politics in threatening trend. Peace and freedom could only be assured together with the United States. That assumed careful management of the alliance--an obligation of both sides, of course. The FRG had to have understanding for the problems of the world power, America, the latter controversially for European problems, including the special problems of West Germany. We had to talk with one another not about one another. The FRG wanted to be asked about everything that affected it. In this connection Kohl has critical words for American behavior with regard to the natural gas pipeline deal with the Soviet Union: he had never been a friend to this deal, he understood American skepticism. But Washington must for its part understand that such a contract, which had been signed after years of negotiation, could not be brought down brusquely with an objection. Still Chancellor Schmidt's rough lecturing to the American government had not improved the climate between Bonn and Washington.

Unity: a historical Mission

In Europe Kohl sees a development making progress which depresses him: a relapse into nationalistic doctrines of self-interest. A government led by the CDU would seek to revive European institutions and establish greater authority for the European Parliament.

"We stand by the treaties which have been signed." That remains Helmut Kohl's key statement on the Ostpolitik of the CDU. But he adds an element of skepticism: the Soviet Union had not lived up to its promises of contribution to a policy of peace, but rather violated its commitment to peace in Afghanistan and with respect to Poland. The CDU wanted fruitful relations with the Soviet Union because it was one of the world powers and had power over the other part of Germany. The CDU regarded the preamble to the constitution, which deals with the restoration of German unity, as a historical mission. Thus it was appropriate to make use of relations with the Soviet Union in such a way that further separation of Germans in East and West would be counteracted. Agreements with the GDR must be carried out in a balanced way with reciprocal observation of obligations. It was time to recognize the

energy with which the SPD sought to falsify German history and to claim it for its regime. Honecker wanted to combine nationalism and communism in an explosive mixture. Proof of this lay in the preparations for the Luther Year in the GDR, the taking over of Clausewitz and most recently, on the occasion of the last 20th of July, the grab for the first time for the resistance fighter Stauffenberg.

But how could this be counteracted in West Germany where a tendency toward ignoring history for reasons of convenience was spreading? Kohl sees here a danger for the FRG which is otherwise immune from communism and at the same time an important obligation from which politicians, also for reasons of convenience, must not shirk. On this theme, on the one German nation and on the conditions for its continued existence he wants to speak repeatedly to the nation, filled with commitment, almost beseeching.

9827
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PARTIES TAKE STANDS IN HESSE CAMPAIGN

Dregger Selects Team

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Aug 82 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Dregger Seeks Further Inroads Into Voter Constituencies of SPD. His 'Campaign Team' Aimed at Workers and Intellectuals. No Discussions Yet With FDP"]

[Text] The Hesse CDU will be looking for the support of workers and intellectuals in the coming Landtag elections. This was the goal which the Hesse CDU chairman and minister-president candidate Dregger had in mind when he explained the makeup of his "election team," which he introduced at Frankfurt last Monday. The five members of the team and prime candidates for ministerial positions in a Dregger cabinet in the event of a CDU election victory, were, as already announced, the Hesse CDU general secretary and parliamentary secretary Kanther (proposed as Minister of Finance), the Hesse CDU floor leader Milde (potential Minister of Justice), deputy to the European Parliament and Hesse CDU cultural affairs expert Saelzer (scheduled to be Minister of Culture responsible for schools and education in a reorganized Ministry of Culture), the Paderborn professor of literature Gertrud Hoehler (possible Minister for Arts and Sciences) and the Frankfurt social welfare expert Trageser (Minister for Social Services).

With his selection of the two last named figures, Dregger has fixed his hopes on the possibility that the CDU will be able to attract new potential voter groups. Gertrud Hoehler, without party affiliation and a professor of German literature at the University of Paderborn, who has been active in curricular reform at that university as well as with cultural-political issues and herself a practicing poet, is to be, as Dregger expressed it, the representative of a "liberal cultural and educational policy." Frau Hoehler's name has also been mentioned in Lower Saxony as a possible Minister of Culture, though, as she said in Frankfurt last Monday, she felt herself bound by the promise that she had earlier given to the Hesse CDU chairman. Dregger hopes, by her nomination, to gain "easier access to intellectuals." The planned reorganization of the Ministry of Culture was justified by Dregger on the grounds that it had become, because of the magnitude of its responsibilities and staffing, a "mammoth ministry."

Dregger hopes to find greater resonance among workers through his choice of the Frankfurt social welfare official Trageser, who, in Dregger's eyes was the "ideal candidate" for the field of social welfare policy. Trageser is a trained electrical technician, has been for 10 years social secretary of the social welfare committee of the Hesse CDU wageearners organization, for almost equally long regional secretary of the Catholic workers movement and for 13 years a member of the Hesse Landtag. Like the other 3 Land politicians, Kanther, Milde and Saelzer, he has been "ministerial calibre" for as long as 4 years, though Dregger did not then present a tightly knit "election team" as the nucleus of a CDU government.

Dregger stressed last Monday that there had been no consultations of any kind with the FDP concerning the assignment of cabinet positions in the event of a coalition government. Any possible negotiations concerning a coalition would be neither ruled out nor to the point as a result of the designation of an "election team." Nonetheless Dregger did let it be known that for the CDU there were basic questions in which the party's philosophy would allow of no concessions. As an example the CDU chairman mentioned the obligatory middle school preparatory stage; preparatory stages would only be introduced with parents' approval.

Dregger offered a modification to proposals concerning Bundesrat (Federal Upper House of Parliament) policy which he had once made himself. At that time he had offered the FDP, in the event of a coalition government, the role of spokesman in the Bundesrat. He now modified this in such a way that he spoke of the possibility of the CDU and the FDP voting jointly from time to time and that they might come to such an agreement as that worked out by governing parties in the Saarland. Dregger's reason: the situation in Bonn had taken a decisive turn in recent months; the role of spokesman allotted to the FDP "was no longer appropriate to the times."

Gries on Strategy

Bonn DIE WELT in German 31 Jul/1 Aug 82 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Hesse FDP chairman Ekkehard Gries. Interview conducted by DIE WELT staffers Manfred Schell and Guenther Bading. Time and place of interview not given]

[Question] On 17 June the FDP in Hesse voted in favor of coalition declaration in favor of the CDU. Do you regret this declaration today?

[Answer] No, I don't regret this declaration. Political trends in the case of our present coalition partner confirm the rightness of this declaration. We passed this resolution as a decision in favor of Hesse and with an awareness that the capacities of the Social Democrats for decision and action in important questions affecting our future have continued to dwindle, that the Social Democrats, in increasing measure, have lost the confidence of the voters.

[Question] What questions of the future do you mean?

[Answer] It is seen, for example, in the very important sector of assuring jobs, of creating a new politico-economic situation with more economic growth, that the Social Democrats here--and I say this in spite of the budget compromise achieved in Bonn--have departed in a very significant way from the concepts of the liberals.

[Question] After the coalition declaration, it was said that this was a purely Land political decision...

[Answer] It is, in a sense, a purely Land political decision, because the only decision made was one concerned with the coalition in Hesse, or even just concerning the willingness of the FDP's willingness to enter into negotiations with the CDU about the formation of a government. In that sense it applies only to Hesse. It has no signal effect for Bonn and it won't set one off automatically. But it is of course not totally unconnected with developments in Bonn nor with our assessment of solutions for the most important political questions of the 1980's.

[Question] How do you propose to mobilize your supporters?

[Answer] The Hesse FDP has always had a difficult time because its membership and its constituency structure is very heterogeneous. At the last Landtag election we did have 6.6 percent. That means there is a very substantial reservoir of liberal voters for the FDP. I believe that there is a ground-swell in this Land that will lead to the SPD and the FDP now not finding any majority--specifically because of the conditions of the SPD. On the other hand, there is a voter potential in the middle, which can be reached by the FDP.

[Question] You're counting on the dissatisfied voters of both the major parties being attracted to the FDP as they were in the Bundestag elections of 1980?

[Answer] Yes, I would like to win over for the FDP those SPD voters who would otherwise switch to the CDU, and I would also like to take some away from Alfred Dregger. After all, we haven't written any blank checks. What we have done is to issue a coalition declaration which says: we are ready to enter into consultations concerning the formation of a government if the FDP is again represented in the Landtag--that is our primary goal--if the CDU does not attain an absolute majority and, third, if we can reach an agreement concerning the substance of a government policy declaration. We want to prevent an absolute majority of the CDU. Yet we also don't want to see the SPD able to hold office in this Land together with, say, the Greens.

[Question] Does the possibility exist that the SPD and the Greens could form a government in Hesse? Would Boerner follow the example of Dohnanyi in Hamburg?

[Answer] I don't think Herr Boerner himself would allow that, since he has quite clearly disassociated himself from the Greens. But there always exists the probability that the SPD, as a party, possibly under different leadership, could come to some form of cooperation with the Greens. I say this from a

certain bitterness at the background of what has happened in Hamburg. We have something similar in Hesse. The SPD is not in any way immune to the Greens, on the contrary. I have the impression that the receptivity of the SPD to the Greens is evolving very quickly.

[Question] What kind of policy would you pursue together with Alfred Dregger?

[Answer] Far out in front of the problems of the 1980's--whether in Hesse or nationwide--is the overcoming of our economic policy difficulties. We have got to assure that the basic conditions in our Land are as they shbuld be, that investments will be made here once again, that quick decisions are preached, for example, with large-scale investment projects, that our energy policy makes sense. These are the most important problems that we have to deal with. But we still have our problems with Alfred Dregger, in education policy for example. We have our differences in the fields of internal security and legal policy. With respect to educational policy, it will be a matter of achieving a reasonable degree of consolidation. There won't be any hasty changes of course. And we will certainly never see a conservative security and legal policy in this Land.

[Question] Along with the important Land political issues, the topic of the Bundesrat has come up again and again. From Wolfgang Mischnick has come the astonishing proposition that an FDP/CDU government in Hesse ought to be supported by the social-liberal coalition in Bonn.

[Answer] No, that did not originate with Wolfgang Mischnick but is instead an exaggerated and certainly journalistically provocative formulation which has been personalized for a state of affairs which is quite correct, one with which I myself agree. This Land of Hesse plays a very decisive role in the Bundesrat. And if I say that we want to prevent the CDU from gaining an absolute majority, that also means that we want to prevent the CDU from expanding their simple majority in the Bundesrat to a two-thirds one. Basically, the issue is that the FDP in Hesse cannot enter into a coalition which might cause difficulties for a government in Bonn in which the FDP is a participant. I am of one mind with Dregger on that point.

[Question] And you don't expect that a CDU/FDP prototype in Hesse is not going automatically to be a signal for Bonn?

[Answer] There's no automatic certainty of anything. That's also not my intention. This wasn't the intention of the majority of the delegates at our party congress either, of that I am quite certain. They wanted to make a decision regarding Hesse. Whether this will result in consequences for Bonn--that is all speculation. A CDU/FDP coalition could, for the time being--and I just remarked that very thing--function in support of the Bonn government within the Bundesrat. But, of course, it can also lead to a growing awareness in Bonn that there are problems that can no longer be solved in company with the SPD, especially if internal party discussions within the SPD continue as they have. One could also assume that there are preparations under way at a national level within the FDP that could lead to the kind of coalition declaration that we have seen here in Hesse.

[Question] There has recently been a good deal of criticism of Genscher. What kind of decision do you anticipate from [the FDP congress in] Berlin?

[Answer] I am quite convinced that Genscher, despite all the criticism that is now being leveled at him and despite a good deal of irritation that can be observed recently, has a broad-based support in the party. I remark very deliberately: in the party. On this point one frequently has to distinguish between party members on the one hand and delegates and party officials on the other.

[Question] You speak of irritations. Who is responsible for this? Also, in recent weeks there have been efforts on the part of the Social Democrats in Bonn to bring about a test of strength between Genscher and Mischnick.

[Answer] There is no doubt that certain anxieties have arisen as a result of the actions and statements even of leading FDP figures in Bonn. This is felt quite definitely in discussions within the party itself. But certainly many things have also been overinterpreted, and many words have been said in haste. I believe that this is now behind us.

[Question] Put concretely: will there be an opposing candidate to Genscher at Berlin?

[Answer] I really don't believe that there will be an opposing candidate, because I don't see any. I can't imagine that it would be Wolfgang Mischnick. I just can't imagine it. And I am convinced that Genscher is going to find a broad base of support.

Boerner on Issues

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 2 Aug 82 p 22

[Interview with Hesse Minister President Holger Boerner. Interview conducted by Wiesbaden correspondent of the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, Jochen Siemens; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Holger Boerner, Minister President of Hesse, responds to questions concerning the Bonn budget compromise, the coalition climate in Wiesbaden and the use of the class action complaint in connection with the judicial decision on the new Frankfurt airport runway. The text of the interview is published in full.

[Question] What position is the Hesse Land government going to take with respect to the budget decisions in Bonn and which of these decisions are unacceptable to you as a Social Democrat?

[Answer] The Hesse Land government will this year, as it has in past years, look carefully and without prejudice at the Federal budget. It won't be able to take a definitive position until the budget has been enacted in the

Bundestag, but it will make its position clear at the so-called budget scrutiny in the Bundesrat this September.

[Question] Criticism has been heard from the SPD concerning the proposal to have patients pay some share of their hospital treatment costs. In light of your coming election campaign, is this part of the Bonn resolutions something that you can support?

[Answer] This point in the Bonn resolutions has absolutely nothing to do with the budget but instead is nothing else than the political price which the FDP demanded for their support of the new tax measures. Let me explain this: cost effectiveness in health services is called for. But anyone who is going to demand of people covered by health insurance, who are already paying high premiums, namely 11 percent of their income, that they make sacrifices, has also got to examine the question of whether physicians fees and the ever-rising costs of medications ought to be reviewed. The Federal Government has not yet given sufficient attention to these last two issues.

I am, just so that there will be no misunderstanding on this point, also against the abuse of health insurance. But when a patient is admitted to a hospital, and this is the point of my criticism, and I am after all a man who started in the social services side of politics, 25 years ago I was a member of the social welfare committee of the Bundestag and have played an important role in drafting a good many pieces of legislation--it is not the patient who makes the decision on his admission to a hospital but the physician. What this means is that these 5 marks are being levied as a fine on anyone who has to be admitted to a hospital because there is no other way to treat his case. And that's why I regard this measure as wrong in terms of social welfare policy. The issue is not the 5 marks. Anyhow, in my opinion, this amount is going to produce more in administrative costs than the amount to be charged to the patient.

[Question] It sounds as if you were going to take a clear position on this point in the Bundesrat against the Bonn resolutions?

[Answer] Well, I am still not convinced that this part of the Bonn resolutions is going to find majority support in the Bundestag so that I can hold off on this point until a definitive statement is made. But I will make no secret of the fact that I am in full agreement with the trade unions on this issue because, as I said, this will affect innocent parties--people who are not free to choose one form of therapy or another but instead have to be told by their doctor: for the sake of your health you are going to have to go into the hospital. In addition, the persons affected are going to have to pay this amount twice. This means that private sector employees of all kinds will be hit twice. He is going to pay what is already a very high premium and then if he makes use of his health insurance in case of sickness, he will have to pay an additional contribution. This I regard as contrary to the spirit of the insurance system and it is also going to drive a wedge between wageearning persons, because officials and employees in public service have the

chance to recoup at least part of these costs from their government benefits. The man on the production line at Opel and in the Hoechst plant can't do that. To me, to put it briefly, this measure offends my sense of fairness. This is an attempt to throw the German social security system out of gear, a system which is based upon collective risk. And I would add that I would be very happy to enter into a discussion on the issue, because Herr Lambsdorff, as a member of the Federal Government, immediately after the budget compromise in Bonn, brought this issue up once again by his public statements about the necessity of further cutbacks in social welfare benefits that he thought were necessary, his remarks being published in the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU on 10 July. You can assume from Lambsdorff's remarks that, in the eyes of the FDP, these 5 marks are only the beginning. And that's why I say: beware of these beginnings. Lambsdorff's relationship to the social security system is not quite as close as it is to donations from big business.

[Question] The criticism of the proposed patient surcharge has been used by the FDP in Wiesbaden to make the point that the Social Democrats in Hesse are sawing away at the legs of the chancellor's chair. Minister of the Interior Gries went so far as to say that the votes of the SPD in Hesse were votes cast against the chancellor.

[Answer] Let me say on that point, first of all, Herr Gries is in a bad way for evidence ever since his party voted by a slender majority to support Dregger and secondly, it is my intention to defend the Federal chancellor against any mud that the Free Democrats might choose to sling at him.

[Question] Here in Hesse you have been put into the very unusual position of having to govern with a coalition partner which has already issued a declaration against this very coalition. The tons of voice heard in coalition circles is growing ever harsher. You have called Herr Gries a "political mine sniffer" and the FDP has paid back with the same coin. How can you continue to govern with the FDP and at the same time conduct an election campaign?

[Answer] Point number one, a passing remark, the expression "mine sniffer" has certainly been misinterpreted by those who have little or no knowledge of military matters. A "mine sniffer" is [not a dog, but] someone who is sent out in advance of his unit and who sacrifices himself for others and thus a very honorable remark that I made concerning Herr Gries. Now to the point of your question: of course the general public understood what it meant, when immediately after the FDP's Darmstadt resolution, my two colleagues in the cabinet handed in their resignations. For the FDP this response did not fit in with their own image of things. The citizens of Hesse know that I always keep my promises even though this sometimes requires unpopular decisions, and they can rely upon me to meet my obligation to them to lead this government until the last day of its term. In any case, everyone knows that the minister president lays down the broad guidelines of policy.

[Question] The Hesse minister of economics Klaus-Juergen Hoffie, is not making your decision to govern to the bitter end an easy one. When the

decision was made concerning Biblis C, the nuclear recycling installation, and the most recent decisions on the new Frankfurt airport runway, it was always the fast pace set by your economics minister that brought the Land government into difficulties. How do you assess this situation?

[Answer] These are three different issues. About the new runway, I would rather not make a statement because at the moment this is awaiting a court decision and I want to wait for its outcome. My opinion concerning the necessity for the expansion of the Frankfurt airport has not changed.

In the discussion of the recycling plant I very clearly made use in the cabinet of my responsibility to set the guidelines of policy and caused the issue of its location to be decided politically and not be left in the hands of industry. At the same time I proposed a new concept of citizen input which would, for the first time, accompany this difficult decision process, because I didn't want the citizens to feel that they had been bypassed but instead could be convinced. What I had in mind was something that I had seen in England where I spoke 3 years ago to the British atomic energy commission and its president said to me: Herr Boerner, half of my working time is spent in public relations, seeking to convince the citizens. I would be happy if Herr Hoffie had taken advantage of this insight.

The third problem, Biblis C, when I presented it to the Landtag, was provided with clear conditions, and when these conditions for nuclear waste disposal are met, then the government, under my direction, can stick by its word.

[Question] With the construction of the new Frankfurt runway the absurd situation has arisen of a race between the decisions of the courts and the cement mixers. The BUND has submitted one appeal for expedition after another to the courts. You have expressed your own criticism, in this connection, of the use of a class action complaint. What is your criticism directed at?

[Answer] I don't want to complicate the discussion, instead I have referred to the fact that in what is here at the moment a very controversial discussion concerning the tunnel, the right to present a class action complaint, which exists only in Bremen and Hesse, has led to an agreement between the property owners adjoining the airport and the FAG, through which the 50 hectares of woodland was able to be preserved. I have always been on the side of preserving the woodland and this is why I am sympathetic to this practical arrangement which departs from the original planning resolution. What the legislature, which after all did enact this class action, will make of this development, I can't at the moment say, but I can imagine that in the new Landtag these experiences with the application of the class action complaint will be noted when it is reviewed and amended.

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PAPERS VIEW RETURN OF STALINISTS TO CP, ELECTION OF ALHO

Party Central Committee Discussions

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 23 Aug 82 p 5

[Article by Hannu Kuparinen: "Satisfied Jouko Kajanoja: Had to Put an End to Vacancy Situation"]

[Text] Branded an optimist in the bourgeois press, Jouko Kajanoja was satisfied and relieved when the Central Committee unanimously and with only a little grumbling approved the final result of the unification negotiations.

When he assumed his chairman's duties at the party congress last spring, he had to begin to collect party leaders from that throne.

Dissatisfied with the congress' choice of candidates, the minority faction at that time announced that it would immediately refrain from performing its party leadership duties.

"Negotiations will begin after we have slept on it tonight," Kajanoja announced in Culture House in the midst of the confused atmosphere of the congress night session, in a very self-assured manner in the opinion of many.

Three months later on a Sunday afternoon after a harmonious Central Committee session at Siikaranta, he again gave the impression of being very sure of himself.

In Jouko Kajanoja's opinion, that is how it had to happen.

"Putting an end to the party leadership's vacancy situation as quickly as possible was absolutely necessary," he said.

"This decision creates the conditions for shaping a uniform policy, and that is certainly the most important thing for us," he explained.

Kajanoja made it clear that he had himself noticed how the party leadership situation had led to a wait-and-see attitude in the party cells too. There too, they stopped to see what was actually going to happen.

"This waiting around has been a real block to the development of unity," Kajanoja said.

He added that he still believes that a real collective spirit will be produced by joint activity and that this development could begin now.

Statement Is No Surprise

When chairman Kajanoja began to read the statement on the unity negotiations to the Central Committee on Sunday morning, everyone already knew what its essential contents would be.

All Central Committee members had gotten word of it by Saturday evening at the latest. After many unofficial discussions, it had also become clear that a motion for a resolution to issue a statement on certain personal arrangements would be unanimously approved.

Only a few speakers had a hand in the motion for a resolution during the Central Committee discussions. Of the unification negotiators, only Taisto Sinisalo commented on and judged the statement. Kajanoja merely contented himself with reading the statement jointly approved by the negotiators.

Did Not Meet Expectations

Regarding the moratorium on party leadership duties, Taisto Sinisalo announced that the outcome of the negotiations would provide the conditions for unity.

In Sinisalo's opinion, the results of the negotiations did not fully meet expectations, but were a step in the right direction.

Helja Tammisola of Helsinki regarded as positive the fact that there was no contradiction between Central Committee power and party rules in the resolutions.

On the other hand, she criticized the way in which the decision was reached as being abnormal. She said that the motion for a resolution was a take-it-or-leave-it document.

Ossi Sjoman of Helsinki replied to Tammisola saying that he felt that the motion was a realistic one.

"If it was produced in an abnormal way, that was because of the situation the Central Committee was in," he said.

Seppo Rousu of the Oulu District said that he felt that the agreement between the two factions was favorably received.

To be sure, he added that this was a cosmetic action in comparison with those demands that had been presented by the minority faction.

Aside from Taisto Sinisalo, minority-faction representatives did not take the floor at all on the resolution. Nor were they very eager to criticize the resolution either.

Modest Resolution

Right at the meeting, TIEDONANTAJA chief editor Urho Jokinen and Member of Parliament Sten Soderstrom sat there listening to how the Central Committee had decided to call on them and Yrjo Hakanen, Timo Berghom and Kari Selinheimo to observe committee meetings.

At the same time Taisto Sinisalo was appointed chairman of the International Affairs Committee in place of Ville Pessi. Urho Jokinen was appointed to the Information Committee from which Seppo Iisalo stepped down.

While the last election of a chairman before this was an abundantly dramatic affair, this time it took place more modestly.

By the time the rapping of the chairman's gavel confirmed the election of Veikko Alho to the Politburo and also vice chairman of the SKP (Finnish Communist Party), he himself had already left for another engagement.

Official Statement from Central Committee

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 23 Aug 82 p 5

["Full text" of statement by SKP chairman Jouko Kajanoja made to the Central Committee; date and place not given]

[Text] At the meeting, chairman Jouko Kajanoja presented a statement on the discussions on unification engaged in this summer.

According to Kajanoja, primarily four sets of issues were dealt with in the discussions: the ideological effort, political issues, SKP-CPSU relations and organizational issues.

We publish here the statement on the unification discussions in its entirety:

The basis for unification discussions was a policy line that could be agreed on at party congresses.

The SKP is a working class party. It is based on our country's worker movement and the best traditions of the Finnish people, its revolutionary and democratic traditions. The SKP is a Marxist-Leninist party. Its activities are based on principles involving the international nature of the working class and on solidarity among all the workers in the world. It is a firm party to the international communist movement.

The SKP's main policy line consists of actions aimed at the establishment of a democratic front based on the common interests of worker population groups

in the struggle to extend democracy in opposition to monopolies and political reaction, the consolidation of peace and the creation of the conditions necessary for socialism.

In the course of the discussions, it was affirmed that the establishment of unity must be based on the following viewpoints, among others:

Ideological Effort

During the discussions, it was affirmed that the international and national situations, which have come to a head, the need to point the way out of the capitalist crisis and anticomunist efforts, which have been intensified through rightist tendencies, require a strengthening of the party's ideological effort.

The ideological struggle will require the creation of timely policy lines based on the party's ideological foundations and responses to and a fight against the bourgeois world view and attitudes arising from it. From the standpoint of the ideological effort, it is important for us to renew our efforts to revise the party platform decided on at the 19th SKP Congress. This will require extensive discussion of the drafting of the platform in the party organizations and in the press that covers those districts in which the party wields influence as well as the stimulation of discussion elsewhere in the society.

Party study activities must be intensified by linking them with the drafting of the platform as well as the problems and goals of leftist politics, among other things. We pushed the special congress resolution to ascertain the requirements for founding a party research institute.

Political Issues

During the discussions, the timeliness of the decisions involving political issues made at the 19th and special party congresses and of the Central Committee resolutions specifying what the party is to do about them was affirmed.

In accordance with these decisions, it was affirmed to be important for the party's internal and economic policy lines to be made conspicuous and for us to work on them on this basis on the job, in residential areas and in the mass organizations as well as in Parliament and in the government in reaching important social policy decisions this coming fall and winter.

It is especially important for activities relating to the budget, labor contract negotiations and parliamentary elections to form a consistent whole as concerns our fall and winter efforts. The Labor Ministry proposal regarding employment will, among others, provide a basis for these activities.

It was felt to be particularly important for us to make our actions more effective in order to carry out the special congress resolutions pertaining to the peace effort and "the SKP's plan for the 1982 peace campaign." It was also affirmed to be important for us to press for the implementation of the special

congress resolutions in order to continue our appraisal of the government and estimate which directions foreign policy and the party constituency are moving in.

SKP-CPSU Relations

SKP-CPSU relations are built on confidence-inspiring cooperation. This cooperation has brought the SKP rich experience and the results of research efforts and it has helped the party in its struggle to gain recognition for the achievements of social progress, peace and socialism.

On the basis of cooperation between the two parties, the SKP has been able to make a big contribution to the advancement of Finnish-Soviet joint activity in several areas of the life of the society and to the combatting of opposition to the Soviets.

During the discussions, the need for working to further improve SKP-CPSU relations in an enterprising way within the SKP was affirmed. The Soviet Union's central position in the effort to establish socialism and in terms of today's most crucial problem, the preservation of world peace and the promotion of disarmament, underlines the significance of strengthening cooperation.

The SKP lends its unreserved support to the peace program and the initiative to secure detente and disarmament, to avoid a nuclear catastrophe, composed by the CPSU and the Soviet Government.

The SKP will combat and condemn campaigns directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and expresses its solidarity with the CPSU and the communist parties of other socialist countries.

Organizational Matters

Strengthening the SKP means stressing a tightening of organizational unity to be built up on the basis of party ideological and political unity.

During the discussions, it was asserted that it was indispensable for us to protect party members and organizations' equality and the collective drafting of resolutions and adherence to them. In order to develop democracy in the party, the importance of extending the influence on party operations of party districts and cells and especially of Communists working on the job was affirmed.

The importance of jointly preparing for the October peace and labor day demonstrations as well as the party meeting, especially in connection with the drafting of a platform, to be organized in the spring was affirmed.

During the discussions, the urgency of reaching a decision on the press and the securing of unity in connection with preparations for the parliamentary elections and the nomination of candidates in accordance with special congress resolutions were further emphasized.

The discussions led to recommendations to the Central Committee to assign the following persons to leadership posts:

Veikko Alho would be added to the Politburo and he was chosen to be vice chairman of the SKP. The distribution of Politburo members' areas of responsibility would also be examined. In addition to those who had been invited earlier, Timo Bergholm, Yrjo Hakanen, Urho Jokinen, Kari Selinheimo and Sten Soderstrom would be invited to attend Central Committee meetings. Taisto Sinisalo was elected chairman of the International Affairs Committee and Urho Jokinen was elected a member of the Information Committee.

Moderate-Wing CP Organ Gives Views

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 24 Aug 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Political Achievement"]

[Text] Those members of the party organs who had, after all, been elected to them by a very thin vote margin and who had boycotted their duties since the special congress returned to those party organs at the SKP Central Committee meeting held at the end of the week. In so doing, an abnormal state of affairs that had for absolutely no reason impeded the work of the party organs was corrected, one which had produced only negative consequences because, in citizens' opinion, it had cast a shadow over the party and the People's Democratic movement's image.

The decisions show that the minority wing's extremist forces were finally convinced that they had no great likelihood of succeeding outside of the party and the People's Democratic movement; they decided to go back to their duties in the party organs. It is to be hoped that those who have now returned will not regard their decision as merely a tactical maneuver dictated by the approaching elections — such tactics have been tried too often in party activities over the past few years — but will instead in a serious manner tackle their jobs in the party organs. At any rate the party is actively continuing to pursue its political and organizational policy line, which the special congress formulated in the spring, and to go back to observing the normal principles of party life.

The decision is at any rate a political victory for the party and the People's Democratic movement. It raises the party's prestige and gives it an opportunity to gather forces for the big political battle of the moment.

The common view of the combat missions to be engaged in in the immediate future that prevails in the party district became apparent in the broadly-based discussions held in connection with the Central Committee meeting. There is a clearcut action line for the job the party will be doing during the next few months in the Central Committee meeting resolutions, which deal with the budget and employment policy, party cell work, Central Committee action plans and platform reform and other issues.

Stalinist Organ Lauds Reconciliation

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 24 Aug 82 p 2

[Editorial: "The SKP's Decision"]

[Text] The Central Committee of the SKP has unanimously approved the bases for integrating the SKP leadership, bases according to which those who have thus far refrained from performing their duties as SKP leaders will participate in the highest SKP party organs as well as in Central Committee and Politburo meetings. On the basis of the decision that has just been made, the SKP leadership is organizationally united and clearcut guidelines have been agreed on for the integration of ideological activity and policy.

The decisions of the special congress held in May, especially those made in violation of the rules for the election of party leaders, and the exercise of discrimination in the elections led to the split among SKP leaders. These events forced eight district organization candidates to refuse to perform their leadership duties and no attempts at conciliation were able to prevent discrimination either.

For several months they have been negotiating to put the party leadership back on a sound foundation. And now at the meeting held at the end of last week, the attempt has finally succeeded. To be sure, some of those who participated in the discriminatory actions in May had to reluctantly swallow the conciliatory decision that has now been reached. But they were unable to prevent the decision from being made.

The course of events has shown that the principled stand taken by those who had been forced out of the party leadership and their determination not to submit to discrimination were decidedly the right stance and the right decision.

Through this principled stand, they created the conditions required for the solution that has now been produced and weakened those positions based on discrimination in the solving of party problems and which are aimed at changing the nature of the party. Without May there would have been no August now; that is, if they had not refused to submit to discrimination at the special congress, we would not now have reached an agreement on party operation that contains certain promising possibilities.

The agreement and all the decisions made by the Central Committee are not completely satisfactory, nor are they as such guarantees of a better situation either. But opportunities for acting are now opening up and that is a relatively big improvement. The agreement does not guarantee a change in actual policy, but the guidelines for it are unambiguously expressed in the agreement.

Certain important requirements for specific political action have been created. Chairman Kajanoja's employment program, which was produced during the negotiations on integration, is one such requirement.

It is very important to note that the SKP's position and operation as a Marxist-Leninist party which has, for example, assumed the most important obligations to defend the interests of the workers in the fight over the budget and the TES [National Wage Agreements] are emphasized in the text of the agreement and in the Central Committee's other resolutions. To carry out these obligations, resolutions and missions, we need the full strength of the Communists and their solid cooperation with the supporters and friends of the party as well as with the broad masses of workers.

The negotiations are over. The agreements have been reached. The resolutions have been made. Now let's get to work!

Conservative Organ Sees Conciliation As Facade

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 24 Aug 82 p 2

[Text] At the end of the week the SKP set up a facade on the steps of the main entrance to the party that was put together this summer. The image of party unity that was painted on the facade will be needed in next winter's parliamentary elections. The facade does not necessarily have to last any longer than the elections.

To all appearances, the SKP really did seem to have integrated itself at the end of the week when the party organs unanimously approved everything that was issued from above without votes or discussions. New on the job this summer, over the weekend chairman Jouko Kajanoja got to be like some sort of legendary communist leader, the wisdom of whose orders no one would dare to doubt.

Actually, however, the SKP has merely entered a new tactical phase which will continue until the parliamentary elections. Elected last spring to succeed party leader Aarne Saarinen, Kajanoja in a way reminds one of a business manager full of ideas who has been called on to put a firm on the verge of bankruptcy back on its feet and is forced to invent a new saleable product to save the firm.

As a person with an academic education, Kajanoja, who had analyzed the situation the party was in on the basis of opinion polls, decided that revolution was the gap in the market in which the Communists had room to try their luck. Both the party minority faction and the CPSU representatives who have served as advisers are buying revolution too.

To the party leader's way of thinking, the particular kind of intellectual revolution outlined by Kajanoja would also seem to suit various kinds of leftist socialists and politically homeless voters in the postindustrial society.

The intellectual revolution of educated people that Kajanoja recommends, the effort of the intellectual mole, also seems to be a reaction by the Communist leader himself to the very environment he grew up in, to a self-satisfied bourgeois environment which is capable of stifling intellectual aspirations with its inherited values. How Kajanoja's intellectual revolution fits in

with the revolution promoted by a minority faction still headed by Taisto Sinisalo, namely one which rejects any intellectual activity and demands only unquestioned obedience, will, however, probably continue to be a problem.

The SKP is certainly not alone in the field of politics to be searching for a credibility that has vanished. Time passes parties by, each in its turn. Some parties can meet challenges while others disappear from the map of political parties.

It is very probable that the SKP is at the present time disappearing. Undoubtedly, a nucleus of diehard Communists who want to destroy the old world will survive, but the party name and thus its legitimate traditions will probably be transferred to a party that adapts to our postindustrial society, one that no longer fights feudal lords but understands how to wage a political battle with the voice, and possibly the souls too, of technocrats.

In neither case will the world around us, Finnish society, bow to the will of the party or the winning faction. Just the opposite, to preserve its existence the winning faction will have to bow to the will of the world around it, be guided by it. As with other parties as well, this requires the Communists to forecast the future, not master the past.

There is no particular reason for presuming that the SKP is capable of evolving in a direction opposed to that of a unanimous surrounding world. It can, however, turn its declining support into growth merely by being capable of being unanimous.

Tactically speaking, the party may be capable of appearing to be unanimous by the time the election campaign begins, early next spring. In particular, this would be on the assumption that the minority faction's chief organ, TIEDONANTAJA, cease making loud, pointed statements, whereby the question of the press would not become a public issue. If Kajanoja gets a chance to endow the party with a purposeful, revolutionary form, he may succeed in giving it an image that will garner votes. The durability of the facade depends on TIEDONANTAJA's keeping quiet.

But there is under no circumstances reason to suppose that the party will be unified before the minority faction suppresses TIEDONANTAJA as a national party organ of the type it now is and consents to reducing it to a local advertising medium for a couple of district organizations. The party will not be unified until that happens.

Paper Views Background of New Vice Chairman

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Aug 82 p 22

[Article by Orvo Makela: "Conciliatory Lathe Operator"]

[Text] The SKP's new vice chairman, Veikko Alho, is the very image of a Finnish Communist in overalls. He is regarded as a moderate Stalinist.

The SKP's new vice chairman, lathe operator Veikko Alho, is the son of a member of the Red Guard from Karkkila. He smokes North State "reds" [proletarian cigarette] and offers pink lemonade. Not even in his Red home town did people expect that the chairman of the municipal council would suddenly rise to the top of his party.

In Karkkila Alho, who is now driving his fifth Soviet car -- a Lada basic model -- is known as a moderate fellow. It is felt that it is thanks to him that the Communists on the Karkkila Municipal Council appear to be fairly unanimous.

However, not all of Karkkila's Stalinists cheered when one of their number was raised to such a lofty position. Karkkila's Redness has attracted a faction of academic Communists to the town who are not honestly excited over worker Alho's success.

Karkkila's Communist teachers and doctors had, as far as we know, contemplated having a candidate for the local parliamentary representative chosen from among their own people. Then like a good fellow Alho would have stepped aside, but the party's vice chairman is a hard man to displace.

Veikko Alho is the very image of a wide-awake Finnish Communist in overalls. As a 13-year-old, he went to work at Kymi's Karkkila plant as a messenger boy. Now, the 52-year-old lathe operator has already served 39 years at the plant where his father, who suffered a jail sentence as a Red Guardist, also worked in his time.

Veikko was firmly gripped by an interest in improving poor people's living conditions. He sought refuge and knowledge in Lenin. He became familiar with his works even as a schoolboy and Lenin still occupies a place of honor on his bookshelf. Lenin was later followed by Sholohov, Linna and Paatalo as well as a series of reference works.

In 1953, with his first attempt, 23-year-old Veikko Alho was chosen to be the Young Democrat candidate for a seat on the municipal council. Since then, his term on the council has continued in an unbroken line. He is now in his eleventh year as chairman of the Karkkila Municipal Council.

A local Social Democrat describes Alho as being a moderate: "There's no way to make an extremist Communist out of him. He's good-natured. Hopefully he isn't too good-natured for that job." There are 15 Communists on Karkkila's 35-seat council. Most of Karkkila's Communists have counted themselves as Stalinists throughout the entire period the party has been split. In Karkkila support for the Communists has never been below 40 percent. Right after the war, support for them occasionally exceeded 50 percent.

In Karkkila Redness is more ardent than in Kemi, the country's second Communist city, where the majority faction holds sway.

"In Karkkila Veikko has kept the group together," Alho's local ideological comrade said.

"Veikko doesn't voice his own opinion right away. He has the presence of mind to wait and see what the others have to say," the townsman went on.

Earnest Effort

Veikko Alho's summer vacation came to an end a week ago Friday. Taisto Sinisalo called him at about 0900 hours and proposed that he get ready to be vice chairman.

He had time to think it over until that evening. Veikko Alho replied affirmatively, although "I certainly had quite other ideas about being vice chairman."

"There is no point in calling attention to who called me because a collective decision to do so had been reached in discussions," Alho emphasized, and denied that he would act as Taisto Sinisalo's representative in the performance of his duties: "Indeed, now the earnest effort is gone from the party split."

He believes that cooperation with Jouko Kajanoja will go smoothly. "We really don't know one another very well yet."

Alho and Kajanoja met for the first time the winter before last when a municipal delegation visited the labor minister to discuss matters. Since then, the two men have sat on the SKP Central Committee, where Alho is in his eighth and Kajanoja in his second year.

Alho believes that the learned Kajanoja and Alho, the worker, will complement one another.

The SKP has for a long time now been used to seeing two chairmen personified in public. Alho said that the question as to "whether the vice chairman is still a central figure or whether he presides only when the chairman cannot be present" has not yet been discussed.

Alho believes that a good basis for party unity was obtained last Sunday.

"I am vehemently opposed to there being anything of an election tactic involved," he emphasized, and went on to say that they would now make a serious effort to get party policy to agree more with minority-faction views than before.

As an example of the new tendency, Alho mentioned Jouko Kajanoja's employment package: "It's thinking in the right direction."

Veikko Alho has had an SKP membership card in his pocket for 24 years. He is a man of principle in every way: The CPSU may not be criticized (as Aarne Saarinen did this spring) and he has to drive a Soviet car (first Alho had a Mosse 407, then an Elite and now he is on his third Lada).

In the sofa nook of his own home, Alho answered our questions as unhesitatingly and calmly as he handles his lathe at Kymi. He is naturally polite. At the plant he takes care to see to it that his guests find their way back to the gate and at home he remembered to excuse himself every time the phone rang.

Alho acquired his lucid way of speaking in the course of many confidential assignments. His way of expressing himself is a far cry from that meandering style with which, with their student caps on their heads, young men who have read their Lenin explain his ideas.

Alho did not even attend the Sirola Institute. The longest stretch of time he has spent studying since elementary school was during a 5-day course. When he was younger, he also participated in study clubs.

When Veikko Alho goes abroad, the natural direction he takes is to the Soviet Union. He was in Moscow for the first time at the youth festival in 1957. His most recent trip to Moscow was a vacation trip 6 years back.

Alho was on an official visit to Moscow once, in the early 1970's. The SKP's Uusimaa district organization executive committee was the guest of the CPSU's Moscow district committee. He has a few other trips to Moscow behind him too, in addition to a couple of visits to Leningrad.

Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa recently announced that there are no parties in Parliament that are unfit to govern. Veikko Alho surprised no one when he said that, "at least at the present time," the SKP and the Conservative Party could not be coalition partners.

In Alho's opinion, the Communists in general do not absolutely want to be in the government. In his opinion, that should not be an end in itself. "At least the feeling of someone who works at a place like this is that we have often participated in the government from too weak a position."

Peaceful Revolution

It is hard to picture a peaceful man in the front ranks of a revolution, but "the SKP is a party that is striving to achieve socialism. Its goal is a socialist society."

Alho enumerated that first the banks, the insurance companies and a number of big firms ought to be nationalized. He was not, however, willing to estimate whether there would be 5, 50 or 500 firms on the list at first.

"The big firms occupy the position of monopolies," he specified.

What about Karkkila? Would nationalization be extended to some Nurmi machine shop?

"It is pointless to go into such details. But a Nurmi machine shop is not, in my opinion, a monopoly."

When Veikko Alho was asked how the revolution would come about in Finland, he for the first time sought aid from a piece of paper.

Alongside his desk there were five briefcases full of papers. The new vice chairman quickly found the SKP rules and leafed through them to the third paragraph: "...peacefully, through democratic channels, in accordance with the will of the majority of the people...."

Alho does not approve of the idea that the revolution may already have occurred through taxation and that people's increased well-being is proof of the fact.

"We cannot speak of prosperity when it is predicted that 200,000 people will be out of work next winter."

Alho firmly believes in the omnipotence of socialism: "In the socialist countries there is a shortage of manpower."

The most sensitive of the nonsocialist townspeople are always slightly bothered by the fact that they happen to live in Red Karkkila through a quirk of fate. Many also feel that Karkkila's Redness is a hindrance when they try to get new industry to locate in the town. If anyone had already managed to forget Karkkila's Redness, it was brought to mind again through Veikko Alho's election.

"There is also a good side to this, namely that they found a man like him in this town," a local nonsocialist felt.

They have already managed to give Veikko all kinds of advice as to how to handle his new position of trust as well: "Take a firmer grip on things, make more public appearances, develop Karkkila's trade and industry."

Another nonsocialist wondered how such a good-natured and tolerant person would get along in such a job.

"I only hope they don't roll right over Veikko," a Social Democrat feared.

Especially many of those Karkkila citizens who hardly vote for the Communists predict that Veikko Alho will get a seat in Parliament. So his real supporters are to be found among those ideological comrades whom Veikko's surprising success does not annoy.

Many old warhorses of Karkkila municipal politics have glumly looked on when every now and then young, educated Communists have moved into the town -- into municipal administrative posts and others too.

At first the town's old Communists were glad to have young, educated people join their ranks. Little by little, however, blue-collar workers noticed that they were on the losing side. But now, Veikko's rise to power has again raised blue-collar communism to a place of honor.

On Monday there was a run on red roses in Karkkila's flower shops.

CP Organ Looks at Vice Chairman Alho

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 24 Aug 82 p 6

[Article by Maija Aalto: "New Vice Chairman Stresses Collectivism"]

[Text] When the SKP Central Committee elected Veikko Alho the new vice chairman of the SKP on Sunday, he himself was in Karkkila speaking at harvest festivals organized by his own party cell, out of reach of well-wishers and interviewers.

"Personally, I would have preferred to see some other comrade chosen for the job, but this was a collective decision. Since the conferees decided to nominate me and the decision was jointly approved, I will naturally have to try to do my best to handle the job," Alho said on Monday.

Alho felt that the most important of the SKP's political tasks are the stepping-up of the peace effort, the battle of the budget and the TES and preparations for the parliamentary elections. He views positively chairman Jouko Kajanoja's employment program, which has been well received among constituents and will make possible a common struggle for jobs.

"The most important organizational task is the continuation of the unification process. The Central Committee decisions have created a good basis from which we must now progress. The advancement of the SKP's own role in daily politics will improve our chances for achieving unity," Alho felt.

"Only the future will show us how rapidly we succeed in ridding ourselves of the party split. It is obvious that differences that have gone on for a long time cannot be eliminated by the resolutions of one meeting," he added.

According to Alho, the best thing to happen in the recent development of the SKP is precisely the growth of unity, which has led to constructive resolutions in the Central Committee.

Alho said that he would rather not list the most troublesome issues, but did, nevertheless, mention that former chairman Aarne Saarinen's criticism directed against the CPSU at the special congress still bothered him.

From the standpoint of the party's future, Alho felt that what is decisive is how well we can collectively adapt the requirements for achieving unity provided by the Central Committee solution to actual practice and act in accordance with the spirit of the resolutions that have been made.

Rush in Sight

In Karkkila 52-year-old Veikko Alho is known as a man who is involved in municipal affairs. He has been on the municipal council since 1954 and chairman of the council since 1972. Alho has twice run as a candidate in the

presidential elector elections, but he has not run for Parliament. In Uusimaa the list of candidates for the coming parliamentary elections is still incomplete and Alho did not want to comment on it other than to note that the organizations will reach their decision on the matter when the whole picture is clear, and in connection with that his candidacy will also be decided on.

Veikko Alho has been familiar with work since he was a boy, since he started to work as a 13-year-old in the same Hogfors plant at which he still works as a lathe operator. While he was working, this boy who went from his seat in elementary school to the plant attended a two-grade extension-course school nights.

"Making a living and taking care of the tasks of a position of trust at the same time will certainly mean a lot of rushing around and maybe my work will to a certain extent limit my participation. One day a week will be spent at Politburo meetings alone. But, of course, I'll have to try to organize these tasks to the best of my ability," SKP vice chairman Veikko Alho said.

11,466
CSO: 3107/175

POLL CONFIRMS SOCIALISTS WILL WIN

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 6 Aug 82 pp 4,5

[Text] If the elections were held tomorrow, the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] would receive 37 percent of the total votes in the election, would receive a clear, absolute majority in the Congress of Deputies, and Felipe Gonzalez would be the new tenant of the Moncloa Palace. These results, in spite of their importance, are not the most spectacular in the election survey taken by the firm specializing in these matters, Metra Seis, exclusively for DIARIO 16. There are other results: the survey indicates a tremendous collapse for the UCD [Democratic Center Union]-- which was only able to get 7 percent of the votes in the census--and destroys the myth of the unchecked rise of the Popular Alliance.

Madrid--The PSOE has a good chance of winning the general elections alone, according to the results of this survey, which was developed in detail in every corner of the nation.

According to these results, the PSOE has the most voters already decided, and the most potential voters and sympathizers. Not only that, but its leader, Felipe Gonzalez, would be installed this very day in the Moncloa Palace if there were any possibility of directly electing a president.

The big difference in expectations with respect to the remaining parties leads one to believe that the PSOE could govern without coalitions and with the opposition very fragmented and disunited. Thirty-seven percent of the sample of the people would vote today for the PSOE. This percentage of the total indicates an absolute majority of the votes cast if the expected abstention is confirmed. Up to this point the results coincide perfectly with those of other opinion surveys and with the predictions of political analysts, who foresee a spectacular rise by the PSOE.

AP [Popular Alliance] Rise Not So Sharp

With regard to the Popular Alliance, however, the data obtained by Metra Seis indicate an important new trend: Manuel Fraga's party will make some advances,

but they will not be sweeping. The vote outlook for the Popular Alliance is 10.7 percent, compared with the 37 percent accorded the PSOE.

With this result, the AP would increase its actual parliamentary presence, but it could not become a dominant and powerful opposition party.

Nor could it, obviously, succeed in coming to power, since the possible coalitions among the groups of the Center and the Right would not be mathematically capable of surpassing or equaling the PSOE.

UCD Foundering

In sounding out the electoral potential of the present governing party, the UCD, the survey agrees once again with most general political forecasts: the UCD, crumbling, abandoned by some of its most devoted founders and outnumbered in Parliament, is on the way to the most resounding failure.

In the first place, with 7 percent of the votes, it becomes the third most influential force in Parliament, with some fewer deputies than the Popular Alliance. With regard to the group which now holds this third place in the current Parliament, the PCE-PSUC [Spanish Communist Party--Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia], it runs the danger of becoming a purely testimonial organization. Its 1.7 percent of the votes (even fewer than those received by Fernandez Ordóñez's PAD [Democratic Action Party]) condemns it irrevocably to the mixed group.

Where is the electoral strength lost by the communists going to land? With the PSOE, certainly, according to these results. Almost half of those interviewed who voted for the PCE in the last elections have already decided to put the "useful vote" into practice and support the PSOE at the polls.

Distribution of Votes

This shifting of votes compared with previous elections is revealing in other respects, particularly with regard to the present party in power.

The UCD's current electoral strength is divided equally among four parties: 24 percent of those who formerly voted for the UCD will vote for the PSOE this time, 21 percent will vote for Fraga, 28 percent remain faithful to the UCD and the rest are spread among several political organizations.

Here we must make an important observation: the data contained in this survey, gathered at the beginning of the summer, does not permit us to know how the voting will be split between the UCD and its two splinter parties, formed over the last few weeks: the CDS founded by Adolfo Suárez, and the PDP founded by Oscar Alzaga.

It is more than probable that these latest splinter groups will contribute to a new reduction in the UCD's election potential, which this opinion survey places at 7 percent of the votes.

Nor, for obvious reasons, does the survey include the outlook for another party, the Liberal Democratic Party founded by Antonio Garrigues Walker.

However, Garrigues does appear on the list of political leaders. He is actually, along with Fernandez Ordóñez, the least known of the heads of future electoral slates, because of his recent advent to politics.

In the "most valued politician" survey, Fernandez Ordóñez was rated third by those interviewed, preceded only by Felipe González and Manuel Fraga. His group is expected to receive about 2 percent of the vote.

How the Survey Was Taken

The survey on political attitudes was taken by Metra Seis, a firm specializing in such surveys, exclusively for DIARIO 16, from a sampling of 1,857 individuals over 18 years of age and representative of the national population. The margin for statistical error is plus or minus 2.32 percent, leaving a margin of probability of 95.5 percent. Interviewees were selected at random in 90 municipalities of over 2,000 inhabitants in all regions and of all nationalities. The survey was taken during June and the first few days of July; therefore the most recently formed parties were not included.

I. How the Vote Would Go If Elections Were Held Tomorrow:

A CLASE SOCIAL			B EDAD			C SEXO			D PARTIDO QUE HA VOTADO EN LAS ULTIMAS ELECCIONES		
(1) <i>Média</i>	(2) <i>Média</i>	(3) <i>Média</i>	(4) <i>Média</i>	(5) <i>Média</i>	(6) <i>Média</i>	(1) Hombre	(2) Mujer	(3) PCE	(4) PSOE	(5) CUP	(6) Otros
a. 1.4	3.8	2.1	1.2	1.9	0.6	1.5	1.0	1.8	1.2	3.8	1.7
b. 40.7	20.1	16.3	8.5	4.9	6.5	12.0	15.4	81.5	21.8	3.8	4.9
c. 7.0	8.1	7.7	6.3	7.3	4.1	10.2	7.6	8.5	2.3	29.2	0.3
d. 1.9	4.4	2.5	1.6	0.6	2.5	2.1	1.0	1.5	2.4	3.5	3.3
e. 31.0	30.2	33.7	39.4	37.9	44.7	36.8	32.9	27.3	34.3	4.6	24.2
f. 1.7	0.6	2.5	1.7	1.2	0.6	3.5	0.3	1.0	0.5	2.0	0.6
g. 0.4	1.2	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.9	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.5
h. 0.6	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.8	0.4	3.5	57.2
i. 0.4	1.3	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.3	14.2	10.1
j. 1.7	5.0	2.8	1.1	0.3	0.5	2.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.8	65.2
k. 0.6	1.6	1.6	0.2	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.3	10.1
l. 0.5	1.9	0.2	0.5	0.5	1.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	1.7	5.0
m. 3.0	2.5	2.3	2.9	4.6	2.6	2.7	3.7	3.3	2.8	2.9	0.5
n. 1.3	0.6	0.5	1.5	2.1	0.7	1.5	2.2	1.3	0.1	2.4	2.3
o. 0.2	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.3
p. 12.2	11.9	12.9	12.0	12.2	15.3	6.9	9.6	13.7	11.8	12.6	2.3
q. 19.4	7.6	13.9	21.2	27.1	12.2	22.5	22.5	27.2	16.1	22.6	4.7

Key:

- a. New Force
 - b. Popular Alliance
 - c. Democratic Center Union
 - d. Democratic Action Party
 - e. Spanish Socialist Workers Party
 - f. Communist Party
 - g. Basque Nationalist Party
 - h. Basque Left
 - i. United People
 - j. Convergence and Union
 - k. Republican Left of Catalonia
 - l. Andalusian Socialist Party
 - m. None
 - n. Same as husband
 - o. Same as son
 - p. Would not vote
 - q. Don't know/no answer
- A. Social Class
 - (1) Total
 - (2) Upper
 - (3) Middle
 - (4) Lower middle
 - (5) Lower
 - B. Age
 - C. Sex
 - (1) Male
 - (2) Female
 - D. Party voted for in last elections
 - (1) Popular Alliance
 - (2) Democratic Center Union
 - (3) Spanish Socialist Workers Party
 - (4) Spanish Communist Party
 - (5) Basque Nationalist Party
 - (6) Convergence and Union
 - (7) Other nationalist parties
 - (8) Others
 - (9) Did not vote
 - (10) Don't remember

II. How They Will Vote:

Those who have decided:

What party would have the greatest chance of receiving your vote today?

	<u>Percent</u>
PSOE	39.2
AP	11.2
UCD	6.7
PAD	1.9
PCE	1.7
UN/FN [Union of Navarra/New Force]	1.5
"Whatever my husband says"	1.5
"Whatever my son says"	.2
Don't know/no answer	31.6

The undecided:

Although you have not decided at this time for whom you will vote, can you tell me at least, for which of the following parties you feel the most sympathy?

	<u>Percent</u>
None	10.9
PSOE	9.7
UCD	3.9
AP	3.1
PCE	0.8
PAD	0.8
Don't know/no answer	69.9

PSOE wins: The voting intentions observed in the sampling of the population surveyed is based on the intentions of those who have already decided for whom they will vote and the sympathies expressed by the still undecided.

On the basis of these two ingredients--superior data--the overall result of the survey gives a clear victory to the PSOE, which received a higher percentage of votes than all the other parties together.

The UCD is foundering, although it is not too far behind the Popular Alliance.

The PCE, according to these results, would not be able to form a group in Parliament.


III. More people will vote.

Would you go to the polls tomorrow if general elections were being held?

	<u>Percent</u>
Yes, certainly	61.7
Yes, probably	11.6
No, definitely not	12.2
Probably not	3.4
Don't know	6.1
No answer	5.0

Abstention loses out: If the results of this survey were translated mathematically into reality, the next general elections would have a very high rate of participation. More than 60 percent of those surveyed assured us that they would go to the polls tomorrow. Another 11 percent considered it probable. Only 12 percent have decided not to vote. There would be little abstention, in any case.


IV. How the pie will be divided in November.




Key:

- 1. Voting intentions according to the survey
- 2. New Force
- 3. Popular Alliance
- 4. Democratic Center Union
- 5. Democratic Action Party
- 6. Spanish Socialist Workers Party
- 7. Spanish Communist Party
- 8. Nationalists
- 9. Others
- 10. Will not vote
- 11. Don't know

V. Politicians: They Rise and Fall



VI. Parties: The Image Grows Dim



VII. The UCD electoral pie has very little to be shared. The survey indicates that the Centrists will receive only 7 percent of the vote, not counting those lost with the splitting of Suarez and Alzaga and the formation of Garrigues' Liberals.

[Some questions from the survey.]

Best Known

Which of these politicians do you know, albeit only by hearsay?

	<u>Percent</u>
Calvo-Sotelo	98
Adolfo Suarez	98
Felipe Gonzalez	98
Manuel Fraga	97
Santiago Carrillo	97
Blas Pinar	91
Fernandez Ordóñez	80
Garrigues Walker	71.5
Don't know/no answer	1.6

Garrigues least known: The leaders of the big parties known throughout the nation are known equally by the overwhelming majority of those interviewed, except for Fernandez Ordóñez and Garrigues Walker, who has just entered politics and is in last place.

Study of Leaders

What is your personal evaluation of the political leaders on a scale of 1 to 10?

	<u>Percent</u>
Felipe Gonzalez	6.2
Manuel Fraga	4.6
Fernandez Ordóñez	4.1
Adolfo Suarez	4.0
Garrigues Walker	3.9
Calvo-Sotelo	3.5
Santiago Carrillo	3.1
Blas Pinar	1.9

Ordóñez's Position Surprising: Felipe Gonzalez is the only one who passed the "test" of the leaders, with 6.2 percent. The surprise is Fernandez Ordóñez, who has chosen as the third best qualified, ahead of Adolfo Suarez.

Popularity Ranking

Since the last general elections on 1 March 1979 until the present time, has your opinion of the politicians improved or worsened?

<u>Improved</u>	<u>Percent</u>
-----------------	----------------

Felipe Gonzalez	+23.9
Manuel Fraga	+18.6
Fernandez Ordóñez	+ 3.7
Garrigues Walker	+ 1.0

Worsened

Santiago Carrillo	-23.9
Calvo-Sotelo	-22.4
Adolfo Suárez	-20.6
Blas Pinar	-13.5

Rise of Fraga and Felipe: This graph reflects the notable rise in popularity of Felipe Gonzalez and Manuel Fraga. It also shows the notable drop in popularity of three other leaders: Carrillo, Calvo-Sotelo and Adolfo Suárez.

Study of Parties

On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you evaluate the political parties?

	<u>Percent</u>
PSOE	6.1
AP	3.8
PAD	3.4
UCD	3.3
PCE	3.0
FN	1.5

Socialist Party Approved: The Socialist Party, like its leader, is the only one which passed the evaluation examination, with 6.1 percent. With the exception of this group, it is noted that the surveys give lower marks to the parties than to their leaders.

Second Party

If you could vote for two parties, to which one would you give your second vote?

	<u>Percent</u>
None	17.5
PSOE	14.2
AP	14.2
PCE	13.2
UCD	12.2
PAD	7.6
UN/FN	2.3
Don't know/no answer	8.6

Balanced sympathies: The four big, nationally recognized parties in Parliament, as of now, enjoyed equal sympathies from voters when the question was asked, "To whom would you give your second vote? The PSOE, the winner of the first vote, appears to be first here also, which reinforces its general position.

New Force? No Thanks

For what parties would you not vote under any circumstances?

	<u>Percent</u>
UN/FN	47.3
PCE	30.7
UCD	16.7
AP	16.6
PAD	9.9
PSOE	5.7
Don't know/no answer	29.0

Nobody loves Blas: Almost half of those surveyed, or 47.3 percent, stated that "I would not vote under any circumstances" for the New Force, the ultrarightist party led by Blas Pinar. Nor did the PCE find much support, with 30.7 percent indicating they would never vote for it.

Felipe for President

For whom would you vote for president of the government if you could do so directly?

	<u>Percent</u>
Felipe Gonzales	33.6
Manuel Fraga	12.9
Adolfo Suarez	4.5
Calvo-Sotelo	3.2
Fernandez Ordóñez	1.7
Santiago Carrillo	1.6
Garrigues Walker	1.2
None of these	12.5
Would not vote	2.9
Don't know/no answer	25.9

Goodbye, Centrists: If the president of the government could be elected directly, Felipe Gonzalez would have the greatest chances of getting to the Moncloa Palace, with 33.6 percent of the votes. Following him, but at some distance, is Manuel Fraga. This emphasizes the drop in popularity of the two men who have occupied the palace: Adolfo Suarez and Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo.

Change in Attitudes Toward Parties

Has your opinion of these parties changed for the better or worse since the last general elections?

<u>Better</u>	<u>Percent</u>
PSOE	+25.4
AP	+16.1

Catalonia

CDC [Democratic Convergence of Catalonia] + 0.5

Worse

UCD	-34.0
PCE	-23.0
FN	-14.4

Andalusia

PSA [Socialist Party of Andalusia] -13.5

Basque Country

PNV - 2.9

PSOE and AP up: PSOE and AP are outstanding as the only parties that have "risen" in public esteem since the last elections. UCD shows a spectacular drop in popularity, and the PCE and FN are also lower. Nationalists, with the exception of the PSA, continue in their normal positions.

Goodbye, Loyalty

Would you vote for the same party for which you voted in the 1979 general elections?

	<u>Percent</u>
Would vote the same	39.2
Would change	19.6
Don't know	20.0
No answer	21.2

Vote up in the air: Only a scant 40 percent of those interviewed expect to remain loyal to the party for which they voted in the last general elections. Another 40 percent is thinking it over and the other 20 percent, approximately, has decided to vote for another party.

8735
CSO: 3110/219

EVIDENCE MOUNTS OF PSOE LANDSLIDE

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 13 Aug 82 p 4

[Text] The PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] would make an overwhelming sweep of the general elections if these were held at this time, and would obtain an absolute majority in Parliament together with a coalition Center-Left party, according to a study made by a political marketing firm and published in the confidential bulletin, "Off the Record."

Madrid--The PSOE will sweep the next general elections and be able to attain an absolute majority in Parliament to rule comfortably if it enters in coalition with a Center-Left force or a "joint party," according to a survey published by the bulletin, "Off the Record," which is distributed by subscription to political and business circles.

The aforementioned publication claims to have had access to a political marketing study made by a well-known international consulting firm, whose name was not mentioned, on the outcome of voting at this time by the Spanish electorate, should the elections be held.

According to the bulletin, the report compiled by the international firm uses data from 11 opinion surveys taken during the last few months by different firms which specialize in electoral surveys. These data are in the hands of the government.

The study begins by pointing out that there are three clearly different options:

--A Center-Left coalition composed of the PSOE and a Center party which would be willing to come to an agreement with the Socialists. In this regard, the bulletin in question, which is close to the position of Adolfo Suarez, indicates that the CDS, the party just founded by the duke, might fit into the category of that "joint" Center-Left party to join with the Socialists.

--A coalition of the PSOE-PCE [Spanish Communist Party] (a combination of leftist parties), which would total 186 seats; that is, 10 more than needed to obtain an absolute majority. However, the PSOE, according to the study, would lean toward a progressive-center grouped around Suarez's CDS, thus obtaining a "majority for change" with 190 seats.

Disunited Right

--The PSOE could form a one-party minority government with only 186 seats, as the UCD [Democratic Center Union] has. There is also a variable, in that within Landelino Lavilla's UCD there are leaders like Rafael Arias-Salgado and perhaps Juan Antonio Ortega y Diaz-Ambrona, who believe the UCD itself should occupy the progressive center and not turn itself over to Suarez.

The study does not take into consideration the possibility of a bipolarization at the polls; that is, that the Right could present a compact and united front against the Socialists.

The general conclusions are as follows:

--The Right wins over the Left among the nationalities (Catalonia, Basques and Galicia).

--The Right holds its positions, with some changes, in the center of Spain (Castilla-Leon), but it loses heavily in Castilla-La Mancha, Aragon and Extremadura.

--The Left is overwhelmingly predominant in Madrid, the Levante and Andalusia, and it is winning comfortably in Asturias and more moderately in Cantabria.

--The shift to the Left among Spanish voters in comparison with 1977 and 1979 is spectacular, partly because the Left offers clearly-defined electoral choices, while Center and Right offer a confusing array of parties and slogans.

--The Center, Right and Nationalists (Catalanians and Basques) will not win more than 157 seats. The number of seats held by the PSOE will increase, with 168, and the PCE will drop back to 18 seats.

Survey Data

1. Madrid (32 seats)	Barcelona (33 seats)
Rightist Coalition	7
Center	3
PSOE	20
PCE	2
2. Catalonia (47 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	6
Center	2
Convergence and Union (CiU)	16
ERC [Republican Left of Catalonia]	2
PSC [Socialist Party of Catalonia]-PSOE	15
PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia]-PCE	6
	Tarragona (5 seats)
	Rightist Coalition
	CiU
	PSC-PSOE
	PSUC-PCE
	Gerona (5 seats)
	CiU
	PSC-PSOE


Lerida (4 seats)		Lugo (5 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	1	Rightist Coalition	3
CiU	2	PSOE	2
PSC-PSOE	1		
3. Euskadi (21 seats)		Orense (5 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	2	Rightist Coalition	3
Center	1	Center	1
PNV [Basque Nationalist Party]	11	PSOE	1
PSOE	2		
Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE) [Basque Left]	3	Pontevedra (8 seats)	
Herri Batasuna (HB) [United People]	2	Rightist Coalition	3
Vizcaya (10 seats)		Center	1
Rightist Coalition	1	PSOE	3
PNV	6	PCE	6
PSOE	1		1
EE	1	6. Cantabria (5 seats)	
HB	1	Rightist Coalition	1
Guipuzcoa (7 seats)		Center	1
PNV	3	PSOE	3
PSOE	1		
EE	2	7. Castilla-Leon (35 seats)	
HB	1	Rightist Coalition	18
Alava (4 seats)		Center	12
Rightist Coalition	1	PSOE	3
Center	1		
PNV	2	Leon (6 seats)	
4. Galicia (27 seats)		Rightist Coalition	2
Rightist Coalition	15	Center	1
Center	4	PSOE	3
PSOE	8		
La Coruna (9 seats)		Zamora (4 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	5	Rightist Coalition	2
Center	2	PSOE	2
PSOE	3		
		Salamanca (4 seats)	
		Rightist Coalition	2
		PSOE	2

Palencia (3 seats)		Huesca (3 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	2	Center	1
PSOE	1	PSOE	2
Valladolid (5 seats)		Teruel (3 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	2	Rightist Coalition	1
PSOE	3	PSOE	2
Avila (3 seats)		11. Castilla-La Mancha (21 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	2	Rightist Coalition	8
Center	1	Center	1
		PSOE	12
Segovia (3 seats)		Toledo (5 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	2	Rightist Coalition	1
PSOE	1	Center	1
Soria (3 seats)		PSOE	3
Rightist Coalition	2	Ciudad Real (5 seats)	
PSOE	1	Rightist Coalition	2
Burgos (4 seats)		PSOE	3
Rightist Coalition	2	Albacete (4 seats)	
PSOE	2	Rightist Coalition	1
8. La Rioja (4 seats)		PSOE	3
Rightist Coalition	2	Cuenca (4 seats)	
PSOE	2	Rightist Coalition	2
9. Navarra (5 seats)		PSOE	2
Rightist Coalition	2	Guadalajara (3 seats)	
PNV	1	Rightist Coalition	2
PSOE	2	PSOE	1
10. Aragon (14 seats)		12. Valencia (29 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	4	Rightist Coalition	6
Center	2	Center	1
PSOE	8	PSOE	18
Zaragoza (8 seats)		PCE	4
Rightist Coalition	3		
Center	1		
PSOE	4		

Valencia (15 seats)		Granada (7 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	2	Rightist Coalition	2
Center	1	PSOE	5
PSOE	9		
PCE	3	Cordoba (7 seats)	
Alicante (9 seats)		Rightist Coalition	1
Rightist Coalition	2	PSOE	5
PSOE	6	PCE	1
PCE	1	Jaen (7 seats)	
Castellon (5 seats)		Rightist Coalition	2
Rightist Coalition	2	PSOE	5
PSOE	3	Huelva (5 seats)	
13. Murcia (8 seats)		Rightist Coalition	2
Rightist Coalition	2	PSOE	3
Center	1		
PSOE	5	Almeria (5 seats)	
14. Andalusia (59 seats)		Rightist Coalition	2
Rightist Coalition	16	PSOE	3
PSA [Socialist Party of Andalusia]	1		
PSOE	37	Extremadura (12 seats)	
PCE	5	Rightist Coalition	4
		Center	1
		PSOE	7
Sevilla (12 seats)		Caceres (5 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	3	Rightist Coalition	2
PSOE	7	PSOE	3
PCE	2		
Malaga (8 seats)		Badajoz (7 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	2	Rightist Coalition	2
PSOE	5	Center	1
PCE	1	PSOE	4
Cadiz (8 seats)		16. Baleares (6 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	2	Rightist Coalition	2
PSOE	4	Center	1
PSA	1	PSOE	3
PCE	1		

17. Canaries (13 seats)		Santa Cruz de Tenerife (7 seats)	
Rightist Coalition	5	Rightist Coalition	3
Center	2	Center	1
PSOE		PSOE	3
Las Palmas (6 seats)			
Rightist Coalition	2	18. Ceuta (1 seat)	
Center	1	Rightist Coalition	1
PSOE	2		
UPC [Canary People's Union]	1	19. Melilla (1 seat)	
		Rightist Coalition	1

Parliament After the Elections



8735
CSO: 3110/219

POLITICAL

SPAIN

BASQUE VICE PRESIDENT CONFIDENT OF AUTONOMY PROCESS FUTURE

Bilbao EL CORREO ESPANOL in Spanish 29 Aug 82 p 14

[Interview with Basque Vice President Mario Fernandez by Francisco Beltran; date and place not specified]

[Text] Mario Fernandez, vice president of the Basque Government, handles dialectics easily, and moves from legal terminology to sports similes or irony with amazing speed. The "enfant terrible" of LOAPA [Organic Law for Harmonization of the Autonomous Process], the heavyweight that put Martin Villa in front of the television cameras, he claims that the Basque Government does not feel intimidated, and reiterates the viability of the autonomous process. He does not conceal a feeling of pleasure at Suarez' political reappearance, and describes Calvo Sotelo's term as ill-fated. In an interview granted to this newspaper, Mario Fernandez flatly declares that the anti-Nationalist front is the electoral maneuver of a few ousted individuals, and notes humorously that PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] has not decided on the dates of the Pope's visit, precluding any anticipated manipulation.

[Question] Violence, unemployment, reductions in autonomy....Is the Basque Government on the ropes?

[Answer] To continue with the sports simile that you have used, I would tell you that the government is in the middle of the ring and "dealing blows," in other words, governing. The topics that you mention are very important, but based on the authority that we have at present, we of course do not consider ourselves intimidated.

[Question] The statute on autonomy, the settlement and the autonomous police are some of the expectations that have ceased to be regarded as panaceas. Are not those on both sides who denied the validity of self-government in Euskadi being proven right?

[Answer] I think not. The statutory expedient has already brought great results, and has afforded an effective government action in many sectors of industry; and it is for this very reason that LOAPA and the other attempts at revision and at reducing the content of the statute have been proposed. No one is engaged in censuring the dead. Furthermore, we were convinced in advance that nothing was going to be easy, although we were not expecting the step backward taken by some who in their time upheld the statute. The statute still has enormous potential, and we shall use every bit of it.

'I Don't Need Any Position to Fulfill Ambitions'

[Question] You joined PNV 3 years ago, and now you are vice president of the government. Is it the meteoric career of one who is "ambitious" for power?

[Answer] I have been in the party for over 5 years, and of course I can assure you that I do not need, nor did I need any public position to have my personal and professional "ambitions" fulfilled. And although it is quite true that it was not necessary for the "hertzainoa" to drag me along, it thought that it could not deny my request to collaborate during this period for Euskadi.

[Question] It is said of you that you will head the Nationalist candidacy representing Vizcaya, but also that you actually would like to retire to your lawyer's office.

[Answer] Of course if I must answer from the standpoint of family requirements and inner desires, I am closer to the latter than to the former, concerning which I certainly have no news.

[Question] LTH and the budget bill proved the existence of two movements in PNV, and you, as the majority in the government, were in the one which lost. How do you explain their continuation?

[Answer] I don't believe that there are "movements" in PNV and, furthermore, they are not allowed in the party. There was a series of positionings, which allowed for a state of compromise, agreed upon and to the satisfaction of everyone. Consequently, the "explanation" that you request seems clear to me. I understand that, when there is a party at whose congresses there is a 99 percent "majority," it may be surprising that different views could be maintained in PNV.

[Question] Is the possible exacerbation of the dissension within PNV the only threat to the perpetuation of the Nationalists in power?

[Answer] To be sure, if the threat to PNV's continuation in power is what you mention, it seems to me that we shall have a hegemonic party in Euskadi for the rest of the centuries. The presence of different views on specific issues is not, of course, "internal dissension," but rather clear recognition of PNV's democratic spirit.

'I Trust in the Appeals Against LOAPA'

[Question] The stoppage of autonomous development since 23-F has caused people to think that the present Basque Government will be incapable of manifesting the content of the statute in its entirety.

[Answer] I trust that this will not be the case. It is our commitment to the Basque people to develop the statute, which is at present a useful means of achieving major shares of self-government, in its entirety. If the experiment should fail, it will be despite our efforts for its success. But it is clear that the statute is an instrument; it is the descriptive part, not the substantial part. What is essential

is the commitment to attain self-government for Euskadi, and those who were responsible for the failure of the statutory expedient are seriously mistaken if they think that, in essential matters, we shall accept any situation which they may attempt to impose on us. There are some aspects unnegotiable by any means.

[Question] Do you honestly believe that the relations with the central administration have reached a settlement?

[Answer] Naturally, and, furthermore, the method is quite simple: faithful keeping of the commitments. At the present time, in particular, I scrupulously uphold the pact incorporated into the statute.

[Question] The constant appeals to the Constitutional Court have turned this agency into a third Chamber. What confidence do you have in those filed against LOAPA?

[Answer] The Constitutional Court is not a "third Chamber," and it is not that in any country of the world wherein there exists an organ with similar features. Therefore, those who turn it into a "third Chamber" are not doing much of a favor to the system in general, and to the Court in particular. As for the second part, since we have legal grounds, I trust in a favorable decision.

'Ill-Fated Term of Calvo Sotelo'

[Question] Could the break-up of UCD [Democratic Center Union] and the reappearance of Adolfo Suarez, with whom you arrived at the first autonomous accords, have a positive effect on the Basque Country?

[Answer] I don't think that the break-up of a party such as UCD is really good for the state's party system. Adolfo Suarez' reappearance represents the reencounter in actual political activity with one who, on previous occasions, made courageous decisions regarding the autonomy of Euskadi. This makes it not exactly a negative aspect, especially if we compare it with the ill-fated term of Calvo Sotelo.

[Question] Are you concerned about the expectations of a Socialist victory on the state level?

[Answer] At the present time, it is fitting to say things that would be superfluous in Europe: In other words, first of all, if they win the elections, they are entitled to govern and, insofar as I am concerned, I shall defend this whenever it may be necessary. Now then, the recent behavior of PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] does not make me optimistic; although I still retain some hope that, if they are in the government, a satisfactory "modus vivendi" may be achieved.

[Question] Would the creation of an anti-Nationalist front in Euskadi entail a definitive split in Basque society?

[Answer] The first thing that appears to me is that this is an electoral maneuver by those who are being ousted, and who are capable of seeking any means for satisfying their interests. In this country, there is no bipolarization of the Basque society and, despite the efforts that may make their presence felt in this regard, I trust that it will never happen.

[Question] Polls have by now become common in the preelectoral climate, and some show considerable progress for EE [Basque Left] and PSE [Basque Socialist Party]. Do you believe them?

[Answer] Polls are a technical exercise; elections are the only truth. Since, in addition, many of them "represent" their authors or those who have commissioned them too much, the truth is that I believe them very little. And I say this from the standpoint of one who belongs to a party that is clearly a winner in all of them.

'We Have Not Set the Dates for the Trip'

[Question] Does the Basque Government fear an escalation in terrorism after the announcement by the ETA (p-m) [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group, Political-Military] Eighth Assembly about "attacking" LOAPA?

[Answer] We have already stated that, contrary to what has been maliciously attempted to make people think, the existence of terrorism by no means benefits the implementation of our programs. In the case of LOAPA, it may be an attempt to aim now at a cause that is considered popular. I don't want this type of "help." Terrorism harms Euskadi, whatever its trappings or the excuse that may be used at any time.

[Question] During an election autumn, the Pope's visit runs the risk of being manipulated politically, and some sectors in the Basque Country fear that it may be used by the autonomous executive body.

[Answer] Let's see if it turns out now that we are the ones who tendered the invitation, or who made the Pope's presence coincide with the elections! I think that those who are seeking to manipulate it to the hilt, the same ones who have been circulating the rumor about what we are going to do, can be at ease. But of course it is an idea that had not occurred to us.

'The Basque Parliament Will Not Be Dissolved'

The dissolution of the Cortes and the calling of new elections have not been received with surprise in the Basque Country, where most of the parties and coalitions have evinced a favorable attitude toward this measure.

Nevertheless, the Basque Chamber will not be dissolved, according to the heads of the Basque Government, the only ones authorized to make such a dissolution, and the legislature of the autonomous Parliament will most likely remain until the end of its legislative period.

Actually, "the Basque Parliament will remain in operation, and will not be dissolved, despite the fact that the measure to dissolve the Madrid Parliament has been adopted," according to Mario Fernandez, vice president of the Basque Government, who also gave assurance that, "The dissolution of the central Chamber appeared necessary in view of the crisis in UCD and the situation of the Madrid government." According to Mario Fernandez, "It was a necessary decision, because UCD was not even a majority minority, and the Calvo Sotelo government could not govern under these circumstances."

2909

CSO: 3110/234

PALME DISCUSSES STANDS ON SUBMARINES, NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Sep 82 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] A nuclear-free Baltic Sea would not be a bad counter demand from the Soviet Union in return for the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

So said Social Democratic Party leader Olof Palme at a press conference in Karlstad on Friday in connection with his election campaign trip through Värmland. At the press conference Palme backed the government's measures to tighten the surveillance of submarine traffic in the Baltic.

As a result of the many border violations that have occurred recently, the government has decided to intensify submarine surveillance. However, new rules cannot go into effect before the end of the year.

Olof Palme backed the government's measures in contrast to the Conservatives, who wanted the tighter regulations to take effect immediately.

"I have been in the position more than once when I had to decide whether to step in against submarines with extreme measures and perhaps sink them," Palme said.

"If that were done, one would be taking the lives of several hundred people. That is something one is unwilling to do. Our line has therefore been to chase the submarines away and to try and identify them.

"I am in favor of intensified methods and improved technical aids aimed at chasing the submarines away and forcing them to identify themselves," said Palme. "But there is no reason to say, as Mr Adelsohn did, that I am afraid of the Russians."

What role does this question play with regard to a Nordic nuclear-free zone?

"I have said all along that a key question is the Soviet counter move; a nuclear-free Baltic Sea would not be a bad counter demand. But I have avoided stating precisely what rules should apply. It is too early," said Palme.

Palme did not think much of Foreign Ministry undersecretary Leif Leifland going to Moscow and discussing the nuclear-free zone with a subordinate civil servant in the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

The discussions on nuclear-free zones should be carried out on the political level, he said.

"The sour American reactions to a Nordic nuclear-free zone are connected with the current arms reduction talks in Geneva. If someone rocks the boat, the superpowers are annoyed," said Palme. "I do not think we will be hearing any big noises from the superpowers in the next few months, but that should not prevent us from preparing ourselves," he added.

6578
CSO: 3109/232

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

AFGHANISTAN AID WEIGHED--The aid organ, SIDA [Swedish International Development Authority], is planning rapid action to aid the millions of starving people who are in destitute circumstances in wartorn Afghanistan. SIDA chief Anders Forsse said that it is not yet known what form the aid will take if it can be implemented at all. "We have received a request from the Swedish Afghanistan Committee which sounded the alarm on the situation in that country," said Forsse. If the aid can be implemented, it could involve an aid effort of "anywhere from 2 to 10 million kronor." There is some hope that the aid can be channeled through the French doctor teams that are already at work in the country. Sixten Heppling, an aid program veteran with many years of experience as United Nations chief in Afghanistan in the 1960's, hopes to get people into the clinics that are necessary for the suffering people. "It is urgent to get this aid going before winter. The cold is very severe here 'on the roof of the world.'" Heppling stressed that people should be given special training to enable them to work in Afghanistan. [By Kaa Eneberg] [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Sep 82 p 7] 6578

CSO: 3109/232

MILITARY

BELGIUM

GENERAL ON ARMY STRUCTURAL, PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

Brussels SPECIAL/L'EVENTAIL in French 6/12 Aug 82 p 9

[Interview by Chantal Schaller with Lt Gen Maurice Gysemberg; date and place not given]

[Text] Lt Gen Maurice Gysemberg, presently commander-in-chief of the Belgian Forces in the FRG, was recently named by the king to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces, as of this coming 1 October, at a time when national defense is going through a difficult period and is experiencing a certain malaise.

In an interview that the general granted us a few weeks before this appointment, he discussed the problems faced by our armed forces in the FRG, especially at the level of their personnel and professionalization. From that interview we have excerpted a few points that seem to us representative of the situation of the armed forces as a whole and that relate to the obstacles which the minister of national defense is attempting to overcome.

--It is a fact that we are paying today, in a way, for the reorganization carried out within the armed forces in 1970. The draft call-up has dropped off, and the Ground Force, which had 4,500 officers at that time, has only 4,160 today. The attrition phenomenon has simply been allowed to occur, with retiring officers not being systematically replaced. So that today, in view of the fact that it takes some 10 years for a young officer to reach the rank of captain, we are experiencing a clear shortage of officers at that level. There is simply a lack of young ones, and the solution of pushing the retirement age of commanding officers back from 51 to 54, as has been frequently recommended for several years now, would not solve the problem. For so long as they remain on active duty, within a framework currently locked up tight, they will block the entrance of young officers. Keeping them in service to the age of 54 is to be envisioned only if they are put on "special assignment."

On the other hand, the fact that the favorable economic situation of the 1970's did not encourage applications for the armed forces has to be taken into account.

In the FRG units, we are faced with situations such that, for lack of captains, tasks that normally would be assigned to them are assigned instead to very young second lieutenants. But the problem is even more serious at the level of the noncommissioned-officer cadre, inasmuch as some of them, not manifesting any ambition, do not hesitate to quit the armed forces if they find the opportunity of a job in civilian life. And this after receiving their training and acquiring their experience within the armed forces.*

--Before the professionalization system was established, the militiamen did a service time of 12 months, permitting training and specialization in a unit. But today, the 8 months of service put in in the FRG leads certain unit chiefs to say that they prefer to receive career volunteers to hold certain specialized positions. This is an easy thing to say when we receive, in the FRG, militiamen in place of the volunteers whom we do not have. Besides, it is not certain that the professional will be more highly motivated for the specialized task that he will be assigned. It can be considered that the volunteer has no more to discover after 3 years of enlistment.

Furthermore, because of the reduction of training, as a consequence of the budget restrictions, the career volunteer finds himself even less motivated for his task.

--Thirty years ago, a person entering the armed forces took cognizance of the military regulations and felt fear and constraint. But today, the career volunteer considers that he is doing a civilian job. When it has ceased to please him, he no longer considers himself obliged to put in an appearance. In our day, the constraint of the regulations has disappeared, so that unjustified absenteeism (which becomes desertion after 8 days) is not wittingly conceived by the soldier as an act of desertion. Not to mention the false desertions, which are the cases of the sick soldiers who quite simply forget to advise their units. Nevertheless, it must be noted that more desertions among the militiamen are being recorded than previously. This is probably a contagion phenomenon, like that of the career-volunteer deserters.

--It is certain that the arrival of women in the armed forces has not been an economic operation. It has been very expensive for National Defense to have them scattered here and there and to have provided them with the most modern housing, to the detriment of their male colleagues--housing which, furthermore, is abandoned and remains unoccupied when they marry. Moreover, the armed forces have put a millstone around their neck in committing themselves to taking care of the families of the military stationed in the FRG. This is not the case with the American armed forces, in which the soldier commits himself by contract to supporting his own needs as well as those of the members of his family. With this said, it has to be stressed that National Defense bears expenses, in favor of its FRG population, for which there is no military justification, involving school transport, housing and remote-assignment allowances for the personnel of National Education, Justice, the PTT [Posts, Telegraph and Telephones], etc.

* Editor's Note: And at armed-forces expense, of course!

We cannot help but wonder whether it is right, at a time when the ministerial expenditures are being held in check, that only the military budget should be hit, without the other ministerial departments concerned making an effort to furnish their contribution.

11267
CSO: 3100/916

NEW 105 MM TANK GUN DEVELOPED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Aug 82 pp 53-54

[Article: "105 mm Gun for Wheeled Armored Vehicle; Rheinmetall Develops New Weapons Family"]

[Text] With a joint demonstration Rheinmetall and MOWAG have proved that today that even light-wheeled armored vehicles can be equipped with large-caliber guns to oppose main battle tanks. In this demonstration at Unterluess the newly developed Rheinmetall Rh 105-11 gun showed impressive shooting results even when the SHARK 8 x 8 MOWAG wheeled armored vehicle had the turret at 9 o'clock while sitting on a 30 percent incline. With this gun and its automatic loader in a two-man turret Rheinmetall wants to join in the competition, above all in the United States, for a light (wheeled) MPG/MPWS [Mobile Protected Gun/Mobile Protected Weapon System] tank; the efforts of MOWAG are also directed toward the same goal.

The requirement for equipping lighter vehicles than before with large-caliber, high-performance guns to oppose the most modern battle tanks is not limited only to the United States--other countries also have similar demands, partly in connection with the increase in combat effectiveness of tracked and wheeled armored vehicles. Up to now the armament of lighter vehicles with large-caliber guns mostly failed because the recoil forces of the weapon were too great for these vehicles, so that either so-called light weight guns with lower muzzle velocities (and thus reduced target effectiveness) were used or one was forced to choose weapons of smaller caliber or guided missiles.

For these vehicles down to about 15 tons combat weight Rheinmetall now proposes a 105 mm vented gun, the internal ballistics of which correspond to the L7A3 or M68 gun, which is used worldwide, and which uses the same ammunition. Fourteen nations produce these L7A3/M68 and 44 nations deploy them, so that plentiful supplies of ammunition exist for the 105 mm gun.

By means of variations in recoil force and by using a muzzle brake Rheinmetall wants to develop a weapon family from the new 105 mm tank gun for vehicles between 60 tons and 15 tons. The tank gun with high recoil suitable for intermediate and heavy battle tanks carries the designation Rh 106-60, the one used for very light combat vehicles is called Rh 105-11 (in the United States also known as 105 SLR "Super Low Recoil"). The Rh 105-11 will be equipped with a newly developed, rifled multiple aperture muzzle brake (35 percent efficiency)

as well as an equally newly developed recoil mechanism--the descending wedge breech, barrel protective sheath and firing mechanism will be retained for all members of the family.

This weapons design has a recoiling mass of 1,280 kg and a recoil impulse of 15.08 kNs, as well as a recoil energy of 89 kJ. If the recoil force is now limited to 11 tons, this leads to a recoil distance of 925 mm with a recoil time of 160 ms. For other recoil forces required there are also other recoil distances and recoil times, respectively; the times and velocities were chosen to be tolerable for the entire tank system, but also in particular for the crew.

The following vehicles, among others, can thus be refitted with correspondingly altered 105 mm weapons: M-48, M-47, M-41, M-551, SHERIDAN, M-2/3 BRADLEY (studies run together with the FMC) and various wheeled vehicles such as for example the SHARK. Tests are also being made to see whether the M-113, of which more than 50,000 are in use worldwide, can be equipped with Rh 105-11. If similar modifications are carried out with the 120 mm smooth bore gun, it, too, can be used for lighter vehicles.

For the demonstration with the SHARK, the Rh 105-11 had been installed in an enclosed gun mount--this is what Rheinmetall called the "turret"--which in order to simulate a real turret had a combat weight of 4.5 tons including the automatic loader, that is to say it also includes both a two-man crew and ammunition.

The LPTS (Light Protected Turret System) turret proposed by Rheinmetall has a very low silhouette, light-metal armor plating against 7.62 mm armor-piercing bullets, a stabilized weapon system located outside the "battle space," (which is why a smoke extractor was eliminated from the gun), automatic loader for reloading in every position of the weapon and electro-hydraulic drives controlled by short joy sticks by the commander and no 1 gunner.

The commander sits to the right of the weapon, the no 1 gunner to the left--a concept which because of the separation of the crew is not popular with all military personnel. Rheinmetall therefore proposes a solution with a tandem-like arrangement of commander and no 1 gunner to the right of the weapon. The space to the left of the weapon would then become free for the automatic loader.

Rheinmetall anticipates the following time schedule for the complete development of the new LPTS turret system: 24 months until testable prototypes can be produced, 36 months until delivery of six tested prototypes.

All conventional types of ammunition may be used with the 105 mm weapon. At the demonstration armor-piercing bullets with discarding sabots (APDS) and shaped-charge ammunition (HEAT) were used. With APDS the muzzle velocity was 1,470 m/s and the barrel recoil 900 mm, with HEAT these were 1,180 m/s and 915 mm, respectively. Gas pressure in the barrel amounted to 3,600 bar.

In addition Rheinmetall is working on development of additional types of ammunition. For example, from the KE training round with perforated cone and fin stabilizer (Lochkezelleitwerk) for the 120 mm smooth bore gun a similarly constructed steel training round was developed for the 105 mm vented barrel weapon. Further, a new 105 mm vented barrel-KE projectile with improved internal ballistics (new powder propellant) and a newly developed penetrator will also be derived from the projectile technology of the smooth bore gun.

Since helicopters are an increasingly greater danger to main battle tanks, Rheinmetall is studying a new kind of fragmentation projectile (High Fragmentation Anti-Helicopter), which has shrapnel fragments embedded in the shell. With this fragmentation projectile the first hit probability against helicopters is to be increased from 15 percent with conventional ammunition to about 85 percent. Since attacks on soft targets are simultaneously being considered, for example unprotected positions with long-range antitank missiles, a time fuse which can be set through the bottom of the shell shortly before firing will be employed instead of a radar or infrared proximity fuse. The setting of the time (= flight time) can be calculated from the range to the target and the muzzle velocity.

Technical Data for the LPTS Turret

Combat weight	4,500 kg including crew
Crew	commander and no 1 gunner
Material	light metal, welded
Armor plating	safe against fragments and 7.62 mm armor piercing bullets on all sides
Primary weapon	Rh 105-11
Caliber	105 mm x 617
Recoil distance	950 mm
Firing rate with automatic loader	up to 10 rounds/min
Ammunition capacity	13 rounds
Secondary armament	7.62 mm coaxial MG 7.62 mm AA-MG 76 mm grenade launcher
Pointing drive	
Drive	optional electric or hydraulic
Gun traverse limit	Azimuth: N x 360° -9° to +15°
Slew rate	Azimuth 22.5°/s elevation: 6°/s

MILITARY

FINLAND

'NEW SITUATION' IN NORTH LEADS TO BUILD-UP IN LAPLAND

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Sep 82 p 7

[Article by Harald Hamrin]

[Text] Sodankyla and Rovaniemi--Far up in Finnish Lapland among the swamps and the mosquitoes, superpower policies and the infernal calculations of the balance of terror feel uncomfortably close. The white summer birches and the straggling swamp pines speak of peace and quiet in a remote corner of the world. But appearances are deceptive.

"We are 10 minutes by air from the Soviet border, 4 minutes from the Swedish border and 16 minutes from the Norwegian border," said Lieutenant Colonel Otto Punnonen, deputy chief of the Lapland air division outside of Rovaniemi.

On the other side of the eastern border lies the Soviet Union's biggest naval base, the home port for, among other things, 70 percent of their nuclear-armed strategic submarines.

On the other side of the northern border, Norwegian radar and radio scanning stations are looking at and listening to the Kola peninsula's gigantic Soviet military concentrations and sending this information on to NATO command posts.

On the other side of the western border, Swedish draftees and officers are trained and conduct maneuvers in order to meet the troops of an invading superpower.

The peace and quiet in Rovaniemi are superficial.

In Sodankyla--13 miles north of Rovaniemi and the Arctic Circle--the picture is the same. The German tourist buses pass on their way from Pyhatunturi, the sacred mountain of the Lapps, while camouflage-clad special forces soldiers from Lapland's light infantry division practice blowing up a bridge and disappearing in under the cover of the birches.

Reinforcements

What was almost a military vacuum up to a few years ago is turning into a center for Finnish defense. Reinforcements of the garrisons in North Finland have led to the result that close to half of the Finnish Air Force and a third of its army are stationed here in peacetime.

The Lapland air division was moved to Rovaniemi in 1973, mainly from Jyvaskyla in central Finland. Before that, no planes were based in North Finland, although quite a few practice flights took place up here.

In 1964 the Osterbotten light infantry battalion was moved from Vasa to Sodankyla. Two years later it was renamed the Lapland light infantry battalion. In October 1979 the light infantry brigade was set up with headquarters in Sodankyla and as late as this July, it reached its full peacetime strength when the Osterbotten artillery regiment in Uleaborg was moved into new barracks close to the light infantry battalion camp.

Secrecy

In cold figures, this means that the peacetime organization in North Finland today includes three divisions with a total of a dozen Draken airplanes, a light infantry battalion, an artillery regiment and a few smaller units adding up to 2,000 men.

What the wartime organization would look like is a strictly guarded secret. But it would probably involve 20-30 of Finland's total of around 50 combat planes and a light infantry brigade of at least 6,000 men.

Neither Otto Pannunen in Rovaniemi nor his colleague, Lieutenant Colonel Ilkka Ilmola, battalion chief and deputy brigade chief in Sodankyla, would comment on the international political and military policy background for this arms build-up of the North Finland defenses.

That is something the politicians and generals in Helsinki must talk about with foreign journalists.

But both were anxious to emphasize that today there is power and substance behind the assurances from Helsinki that Finland is prepared to defend the nation's integrity even in the far north.

"We get the latest and best equipment," said Lieutenant Colonel Ilmola and pointed to the first 20 half-track troop transport vehicles from Hagglund & Soner which were parked in the barrack square. "And our recruits are almost all from Lapland themselves. They are familiar with the terrain and can take the cold winters. If necessary, they can make a fire out of wet wood."

Hard Drill

The infantry brigade's recruits are not specially selected elite soldiers. But they are drilled hard to enable them to handle the big strains.

Just 6 weeks after they are called up, they go on a 4-day 50-mile bicycle trip carrying full packs. Along the way they climb a mountaintop and deliver the soldier's oath of obedience to their fatherland and its legal government.

The terrain, the endless expanses, the rivers, the marshy fields--nothing can bar the path of a light infantry soldier. If necessary, he must be able to move on foot, on a bicycle or on skis, in a canoe or in a rubber boat.

And the cold and darkness of winter cannot stop Lapland's light infantry either.

"Last winter we had an average temperature for several weeks of minus 26 degrees [C.] and the lowest temperature noted was minus 40 degrees," said Lieutenant Colonel Ilmola. "But we practiced sharpshooting and slept out in tents as usual."

The discipline in Sodankyla is reminiscent of the kind customary in Swedish units at a time so far back that hardly anyone remembers it today: crewcuts, strict saluting regulations, a march to the dining hall by platoons, absolute silence and backs straight as they wait for their food and during exercises and arms drills.

"It is easier to lead troops when the soldiers have learned to obey orders," said Lieutenant Colonel Ilmola.

Independence

At the same time the recruits are trained in a tactic that requires a lot of independence. If necessary, the defense of Finland will be conducted "in depth." Each soldier must be able to operate and fight behind the enemy lines--just like the famous "sissi soldiers" during the Winter War of 1939-40.

"Our main doctrine is deep defense," said Lieutenant Colonel Ilmola. "We are prepared to fight behind enemy lines and to attack his flanks. We strike from a direction in which the enemy cannot react. We use the geography to our advantage. Our entire tactic is based on mobility. We move between the roads. We have bicycles and skis and we use them."

There are few roads in Finnish Lapland and most of them run in a north-south direction--even though the road network has been improved in recent years and some roads running in an east-west direction have been built or paved. An enemy with heavy weapons and equipment will have a hard time

moving around except on the road system--even in the winter, when the marshy ground freezes over.

"But the frozen and solid surface is a thin shell," said Lieutenant Colonel Ilmola. "You cannot trust it."

No Fortifications

And that is also why there are no permanent fortifications along the lines of the Kalix Line in Sweden. Lieutenant Colonel Ilmola denied that foreign policy considerations lay behind this--an unwillingness to "finger" a potential attacker with the help of a fortification.

"Permanent facilities require a lot of work and take a lot of money," he said.

A handful of "sissi soldiers" with mines and anti-tank missiles can easily blow up a bridge or knock out an enemy tank, he said while leading us up to the top of a mound.

From the clumps of birches beneath us, six "sissi soldiers" crept out. We could hear the report of several pistol shots. A bridge was "blown" into the air. Long before the enemy could turn up with his bloodhounds, the six Lapland infantrymen were swallowed up in the dense green foliage of the birch trees.

Situation Has Changed

Finland's defense policy situation has changed radically in the years since 1960. If the country's strategic center once lay in the south, it has now been moved northward. This is reflected in the structure of the Finnish armed forces, among other things.

"The strategic importance of the northern region has increased," Lieutenant General Aimo Pajunen, section chief at the Defense Ministry in Helsinki, told DAGENS NYHETER. "The North Cape and the Arctic Sea play a different role today than they did during World War II. It has nothing to do with Finland. It is part of the overall strategy. But the result was that we felt the defense of Lapland should be stepped up."

General Pajunen stressed that both superpower blocs have what he calls a "defensive interest" in the North Cape region. For the Soviet Union this involves defending the bases of the Arctic fleet in the Murmansk area. For the United States and NATO this involves defending the important communications across the North Atlantic between the United States and Western Europe.

General Pajunen also reminded us of the background for the shift in balance that has taken place.

During the years around 1940, the dividing line between the two great military powers in continental Europe--Germany and the Soviet Union--went through the Baltic Sea area. The northern Baltic, the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic states were the sensitive strategic areas.

Today the line between the two big military blocs runs straight through central Europe. The strategic center of the Baltic Sea has been moved south to the Danish straits.

"That has made the military policy situation for Finland more advantageous in the Baltic Sea area," said Pajunen. "On the other hand, the North Cape has become more important from the viewpoint of the super-powers."

That is the official Finnish assessment which is also reflected in the March 1981 report of the third parliamentary Defense Committee.

"The importance of defending Lapland appears especially great in the event of the kind of armed conflicts that seem most likely in the present situation," it says.

Another part of the report stresses that "the importance of the ocean areas bordering on Northern Europe increased steadily after World War II." The report pointed to the Soviet North Fleet on the Kola peninsula and the great weight the Soviet Union has put on "defending the network of bases on the Kola peninsula." On the other hand it also stresses that "the facilities located in Norway for the purpose of reconnaissance, surveillance and communication are of substantial importance to the United States."

The conclusion, in the words of the Defense Committee, was that "maintaining the integrity of Lapland benefits the defense of all the North Cape states."

Against this background the Defense Committee recommended a plan for the development of defense forces in the years 1982-86. According to this plan, which was also largely approved by parliament, the real growth of defense spending (after inflation) will be 3.8 percent during the so-called recommendation period. The growth rate is somewhat higher than the estimated growth (3 percent) of gross national product (GNP) in the same period.

6578
CSO: 3109/233

RADIATION WEAPON, MISSILE TEST AMONG RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Paris DEFENSE in French Jun 82 p 86

[Text] Testing of the components of a 2-kiloton enhanced-radiation weapon was carried out at Mururoa on 21 March.

In March, an M-4 strategic missile was successfully test-fired. The M-4 will gradually be installed in the SNLE's [missile-launching nuclear submarines], at the rate of 16 per submarine. It is a missile with a range of 4,000 km and 6 warheads (not independent) of 150 kilotons. Mass at departure is 36 tons. The motor is a solid-fuel three-stage.

The Exocet AM (air-to-sea)-39 missile was not qualified by a fourth firing from a Super-Etandard until 2 February 1982, and it is surprising that Argentina was able to use successfully several AM-39's mounted on its Super-Estandards.

An SATCP (very-short-range ground-to-air) missile indispensable to our three armed forces is under development. It is a weapon with high hit probability, carried in two parts and served by a single man.

The Army's antitank capacities are going to increase:

--The VAB (forward-area armored vehicle) with the Mephisto turret for four Hot missiles has just been adopted. The Hot VAB will have a 4-man crew with 12 missiles available to them. The Hot is a wire-guided antitank missile of 4,000-m range and already arms the Gazelle antitank helicopters of our regiments and combat helicopters. Each armored division will have an antitank company with 12 Hot VAB's.

--Delivery of the OF-105 armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding-sabot shells for the AMX-30 tank has begun. This type of projectile pierces all types of armor up to 5,000 m.

The Defense officials seem to be aware of the fact that none of the conditions for envisioning a reduction in the term of military service--already limited in the extreme in France by comparison with other armed forces of Europe and the world--is achievable in the short term (in Yugoslavia, for example, service is for 15 months, preceded by a course in school and serious military preparation and followed by periods of reserve status up to age 55, representing a full year of service for officers and 6 months for other personnel).

On the other hand, it is indeed felt that the structural reforms following one another at a rapid rate are expensive, trying and harmful to operational training, for they are a waste of time. The essential thing is to evolve, and the armed forces have shown themselves capable of doing so in a notable and exemplary manner since the end of the Algerian campaign (in the Soviet Union, the division structures have not changed since 1945, but the units are very well-equipped and combat-trained).

11267
CSO: 3100/920

ASPECTS OF RESERVES REFORM, SPECIFIC UNITS DESCRIBED**Present Capability, Planned Reform**

Paris ARMEE ET DEFENSE in French Jan-Feb 82 pp 7-9

[Article by Patrick H. Mercillon: "Reserve Systems in the World"]

[Text] Our successive study of the Swiss, Swedish, Yugoslav, and Israeli reserve systems revealed that those armed forces have aspects that are relatively unknown to the French public.

Thanks to its very special sociological structures, the Swiss Army has succeeded in building the world's best accepted system, one that has managed to eliminate the usual military institutional shortcomings found at the ordinary soldier's level. Sweden has developed a concept of total defense in which the armed forces now constitute but the nucleus of a defense system that truly encompasses all aspects of the country's life. Israel has been forced by circumstances to establish the world's best organization for the mobilization and training of reservists.

What lessons can our country draw from these foreign examples? Comparative analysis of various reserve systems enables us to determine the differences therein and more efficiently appraise our own organization, and also perhaps highlight the changes needed to improve our system.

Such a comparison seems to be especially useful at this time inasmuch as the role of reserves in France has evolved considerably and a recent major reform has radically changed our mobilization system.

Role of Reserves

Nuclear weapons have had a major impact on the role and level of conventional forces. The cost and sophistication of modern nuclear and conventional weapons have brought about a reduction in the personnel strength of European armed forces. Present day armies are reduced forces ready to go into action on extremely short notice.

Peacetime forces no longer provide, as they formerly did, a territorial protective cover under which we mobilized considerable human resources who then

had to bear the main brunt of the war effort. Mobilizing millions of men is now out of the question. What weaponry could they possibly be issued?

Today, additional manpower is mobilized to bring regular units up to strength and also support these same units who will have to bear the brunt of the fighting from the very outset. To cope with a major national emergency, all regular units will have to devote all of their resources and energy to their primary missions. Expanded or supplementary secondary missions, plus a large part of Territorial Operational Defense (DOT) tasks, will, therefore, have to perform by mobilized manpower.

Peacetime armies are understrength and have but minimum rear area support. Under these circumstances, they could fight for only 2 or 3 days. Reinforcement by reservists should bring them up to strength by that time, furnish them better rear area support, and thus enable them to handle all of their missions.

In 1940, we mobilized 5 million men. In 1980, army mobilization plans called for one-eighth of the 1940 figure and affected only 2 percent of the working population compared with 25 percent in 1940.

The three services have very different reserve requirements.

In peacetime, the air force and navy already have almost all of their operational equipment and, therefore, have no additional aircraft or ships to which they can assign reservists. Because of the highly technical nature of these two services, it is likewise impossible to assign such equipment to personnel who are not undergoing continuous instruction and training. This situation accounts for low number of air force and navy reservists and the even lower number of operational reserve personnel with mobilization assignments to aircraft or ships.

The bulk of air force and navy reservists are, therefore, employed "on the ground" or "on shore." They are specialists who augment facilities whose level of activity rises considerably in a crisis or emergency situation: command and control, coordination, communications, etc. Some of these reservists are also assigned to units furnishing local protection for air force installations and naval shore-based facilities. Apart from these mobilization assignments, the main function of most air force and navy reservists is to maintain contact with their service through lectures or visits, and in exchange, to promote a defense spirit among the general public, with emphasis on air or naval interests. The British have a very descriptive term for this spirit, namely "to be air-minded."

In contrast, the army's requirements are altogether different in scope and nature. Reservists are used double the army's manpower. Without them, army combat forces are practically deprived of logistic support and hence of their ability to conduct sustained combat operations. For example, two-thirds of the Army Medical Corps' wartime strength consists of reservists. Reservists also constitute the bulk, 80 percent, of the manpower in the 10 "derived" divisions, the four divisions formed from service schools, the general reserve, and the 100 or so territorial regiments. The entire army reserves organization was radically changed with the adoption of a new mobilization plan in 1978.

Mobilization Reform

The consequences of nuclear strategy and doctrine had gradually made the Territorial Operational Defense (DOT) system obsolete. The threat had become omnidirectional. While it did continue to weigh heavily on the northeast border, it could also materialize throughout the territory by means of sabotage, infiltrating commando units, and airborne or amphibious operations. New defense requirements called for powerful but small and operationally ready, mobile and relatively autonomous units. The DOT organization was based on stationary defense units responsible to territorial commands. This organization and the poor equipment of most DOT units confined them to the defense of fixed targets, namely key points or areas throughout the territory but located to the rear of the combat zone. As a consequence, DOT units and regular army units were qualitatively and administratively separated.

In addition, mobilization of army reserves depended on a complex organization operated by mobilization centers. This system inordinately burdened the exercise of command, singularly lacked operational flexibility, and created a division within the mobilized forces with disturbing psychological consequences for DOT reservists. A system had to be found which possessed the simplicity, flexibility, and decentralization which mobilization lacked.

A thorough reform was approved, one whereby reorganization of the reserve forces could be made compatible with reorganization of the army's active forces that reserves are designed to complement. The air force and navy had earlier effected such a reform.

Adoption of a new mobilization plan was, therefore, an integral part of the army's reorganization.

This reorganization of the French Army was prompted by the dramatic situation in which the army found itself in 1976. There was no longer any budgetary coherence and the [5-year] military programming law was not being followed. The army was on the brink of bankruptcy. The gap between conception and realization was growing wider. To remedy the situation, Parliament approved specific mandatory percentages of the defense budget which had to be allocated to conventional forces. It also approved specific commitments on the delivery of major items of equipment to those forces. This parliamentary decision has no parallel in French military history. As a corollary to Parliament's action, the army initiated a reorganization designed to enhance its effectiveness through increased flexibility of employment, while still decreasing its overhead.

The missions and tasks of conventional forces are determined within the concept of deterrence. For each accepted employment contingency there must be corresponding activation of suitable units. Thus by comparing requirements and resources for performing all operational missions and tasks, the army ultimately approved a force structure requiring 30 divisions. The active forces already furnished 15 divisions. It was, therefore, necessary to activate 10 reserve divisions and four divisions formed from service schools, and apply to them the same principles governing the army's reorganization,

namely elimination of one command echelon--in this case, the territorial command--and formation of large mobile and multi-role units.

Heretofore, two-thirds of all French units had been rigidly earmarked for the defense of key points. Hence the reorganization did away with the former distinction between the DOT and the main combat forces. Each of the three services was assigned responsibility for the defense of its own and some national key points. The reserves are no longer handled in a special way. They must be ready to perform several categories of missions and operate throughout France in defending key points by reinforcing the static protection provided by the territorial regiments that have been retained. But they can also be called upon to participate in reinforcing conventional forces anywhere.

Conversely, the forces of maneuver can participate in the defense of key points.

New Plan's Characteristics

1. Regroupment Into Large Units

The greater part of the former DOT units have been regrouped within reserve motorized infantry divisions organized into three infantry regiments, one reconnaissance regiment, one engineer company, plus command and support elements. Units formed from service schools were also regrouped into four divisions, thereby ensuring more efficient use of regular army personnel assigned to these instructional activities.

2. Principle of 'Derivation'

Each regular army division mobilizes a reserve division, with each of its active regiments "fathering" a derived reserve regiment or company.

The active unit prepares for the mobilization of its reserve counterpart, stores and maintains its equipment, administers its personnel, and supports its instruction and training.

3. Rapidity, Progressiveness of Mobilization

Mobilization has two phases which can be either successive or simultaneous: bringing active units up to full strength, and activation of reserve units that do not exist in peacetime.

These two phases can be conducted in stages. Stage 1 is implemented on orders from the high command. It includes confining troops to their post, camp, or station, and recalling personnel from leave or detached service. Stage 2 requires a ministerial order. It includes bringing active units up to strength and positioning the first guard units at key points. Measures in stages 1 and 2 remain discreet and can be taken very rapidly. Stages 3A, 3B, and 4 require a governmental decree. They include mobilization, in graduated steps, of the four service school divisions, organic field army elements (EOA), organic army corps elements (EOAC), logistical brigades, and derived divisions. Stage 4 is full or general mobilization, action which can, in fact, be taken

at the very outset, without any intermediate stages.

The flexibility provided by the five stages makes it possible to mobilize the number of reservists commensurate with the requirements of a particular crisis or emergency--more or less serious or lengthy--without disorganizing the economy by a too sudden or needless call-up.

For large reserve units, the new plan represents tremendous improvement and progress over the former situation. Most of the regiments have been motorized and have received all of their organic equipment. The proportion of officers and NCO's has increased. Training support furnished by active units enables reservists to be given training that would heretofore been impossible. All of these improvements are conducive to that greater versatility required to make reservists capable of performing the expanded missions and tasks assigned to them.

The new plan is an unquestionable success in many respects. Its underlying rationale was brilliant and thoroughly consistent with requirements. Its implementation demanded great effort on the part of active units, but everything went very smoothly. The reservists have nothing to complain about. They have received equipment, weapons, and training; have seen their activities and responsibilities increase; etc.

The reform's most positive aspect is undoubtedly the symbiosis it has created between the active units and the derived reserve units. The active unit is obliged to attend to its reserve unit through existing permanent mobilization organizational structures which are the active unit's responsibility, and by maintaining reserve equipment and supporting the instruction and training of reservists. The active unit has thus become better acquainted with reservists. The latter, on the other hand, are nothing without the support of their sponsoring active unit. They are familiar with the difficulties of an active unit and particularly those difficulties occasioned by the mobilization reform measures. Personnel of the two units now have frequent and indeed even regular contact. Hence it is reasonable to believe, that differences between the active and reserve forces are fading.

Nevertheless, the new mobilization plan does have a certain number of deficiencies, particularly as concerns equipment and weapons (see next issue [following article]).

Manpower

The plan covers a total of 545,000 men: 264,000 regulars and 281,000 reservists. These figures do not include untrained personnel or those stationed overseas.

The mobilized manpower needed to carry out this plan, including the increased number of recalls to active duty, are as follows: 26,000 reserve officers, 52,500 reserve noncommissioned officers, and 245,000 other enlisted men.

Altogether, the French Army upon mobilization consists of:

- a. One field army with its organic elements (EOA);
- b. Three army corps with their organic elements (EOCA);
- c. Fifteen active divisions: eight armored and seven infantry;
- d. Fourteen mobilization divisions: 10 reserve divisions derived from active divisions and four divisions formed from service schools.

General Reserve, Divisional Regiments

The mobilization system is not limited to derivation. The latter represents but one-third of the plan. There are also general reserve regiments and divisional regiments sponsored and activated by mobilization centers.

Selective Recalls in the Navy

The navy views its reservists as a major asset because of both their number and quality. There are 160,000 naval reservists: 14,000 officers, 40,000 warrant officers and petty officers, and 106,000 leading seamen and seamen.

Mobilization Organization

Its purpose is to have an adequate number of qualified reservists immediately available in a crisis situation. The problem is thus twofold, one of manpower and one of quality.

The total number of mobilizable navy reservists is relatively small. In addition, a flexible recall system has been established so as to recall only those reservists the navy really needs.

The current situation is, in fact, based on the concept of a more or less continuous and more or less grave crisis or emergency, a concept that is quite different from the formerly prevalent Manichean peace-war concept. If not enough reservists are recalled, the naval forces cannot operate effectively. There is a lack of efficiency. If more reservists are recalled than the situation demands, then the nation's economy and production effort are needlessly disorganized. For this reason, the navy has adopted a selective recall system. It demands a high degree of individual discipline on the part of reservists who are obliged to report to their unit or ship within the prescribed time, lest their failure to do so disorganize the mobilization system.

Mobilization responsibilities are organized as follows:

- a. At the top command level:

The Navy Staff--Plans Division--formulates the mobilization plan and compiles a list by unit of positions to be filled (number, grade, and military occupational specialty). The Director of Naval Military Personnel (DPMM),

an admiral, designates the personnel assigned to these positions: one primary designee and one alternate designee for each officer, warrant officer, and chief petty officer position; one designee plus a 30-percent reserve pool for all other assignments. To perform this function, the DPMM has two assistants:

1. An admiral, responsible for reserve instruction and training (DPMM/IRAM), who assigns officer personnel;

2. A deputy director, responsible for administration of reservists, who assigns non-officer personnel. The agency handling this work is the BMM/GCR [Navy Register (Serial Number) Office]/[(?) Reservists Control Group] in Toulon.

b. At the regional level:

Each PREMAR [Commandant of Naval District], the COMAR [Naval Commander] Paris, and each overseas COMAR are responsible for implementation of the mobilization plan through Navy Mobilization Centers (CMM) in Cherbourg, Brest, Toulon, Paris, and in the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Territories]. These centers, commanded by senior regular navy officers, organize the recall of mobilized reservists and dispatch them to their assigned units.

Air Force Mobilization Policy, Responsibilities

Under the current defense concept, air force reservists will reinforce active forces and play an important part in the execution of emergency plans and in the protection of air bases. In addition, we must not overlook the fact that reservists are also a key factor in improving the standing of regular air force personnel with the population.

To implement its mobilization policy, the air force established a flexible and decentralized organization in 1964. A real "reserve mobilization" function was assigned to all air force commanders from the air force chief of staff down to air base and unit commanders. At Air Force Headquarters level, the air force vice chief of staff--assisted by the deputy chiefs of staff for operations and logistics, and in close liaison with the inspector general of the reserves--assesses reserve problems, issues general instructions and guidance, and monitor's compliance therewith. A mobilization committee coordinates the work of the various air staff divisions.

The A-3 Division formulates mobilization policy and defines the terms and conditions governing employment and training of reservists. It also administers funds allocated for reserve affairs.

The A-1, A-4, and Communications divisions organize the actual mobilization and issue directives on the assignment, management, administration, and preparation of both personnel and equipment.

Lastly the Reserve Officers and NCO's Advisory Committee keeps reserve associations informed of the major policy lines followed by the air staff,

thereby facilitating a more constructive dialogue and a more fruitful exchange of views.

Preparation for mobilization of both forces and support services is decentralized at major operational command and air region level.

Air regions are responsible--based on requirements submitted by the forces, support services, and facilities based within their territory--for the assignment of reservists, promotion of noncommissioned officers, and logistic support of the reserves.

Drawbacks of Reform

Paris ARMEE ET DEFENSE in French Mar-Apr 82 pp 4-7

[Article by Patrick H. Mercillon]

[Text] New Mobilization Plan's Deficiencies

The youngest boy in a large family often has to wear hand-me-downs from his big brothers. With few exceptions, the same is true with the reserves in France. They have American equipment of World War II vintage or French equipment of the 1950's. Equipment modernization in the reserves has not kept abreast of the times, and hence these equipment problems are liable to have a serious impact on our combat readiness.

1. Impaired Mobility

Regiments equipped with jeeps, Renault 4 x 4 trucks, Simca's, GMC's [World War II General Motors 2 1/2-ton trucks], etc.--not to mention those regiments who still must depend on requisitioned vehicles--have to struggle with problems connected with storage of old equipment. It is a known fact that vehicles wear out more when left idle than when used regularly. Reservists do not use their vehicles often enough. And in any case, they rarely use all of them. Active regiments do not have sufficient maintenance personnel to carry out a consistent program of scheduled inspections, road tests, and maintenance of reserve vehicles.

Reservists ought to participate in maintaining their vehicles, or else these vehicles should be assigned on a rotational basis to the active unit so that they may get regular use. There are storage problems also with the old radio sets which function properly only after 2 to 3 days of continuous use. Their limited range frequently compels reserve regiments to restrict their field exercises to relatively small areas, a situation inconsistent with the mobile defense concept.

2. Inadequate Training

Reserve officers assigned to derived regiments can receive proper instruction through attendance at monthly drill and training periods, and through regimental command post exercises. Such instruction is designed merely to

maintain a level of proficiency previously acquired. Because of lack of time, it can never provide the "intensive training" required to be able to cope with combat situations.

The real trouble, however, lies with the noncommissioned officers, very few of whom attend these voluntary drill periods. Their absenteeism can be attributed to job-related or family difficulties, but primarily to the fact that the absence of privates and other lower-ranking enlisted men at these drills deprives reserve noncommissioned officers of any opportunity to perform their normal command functions. Without this key role as the link in the chain of command between officers and enlisted men, reserve NCO's do not feel they are useful. As for the instruction and training of reserve privates and other lower-ranking enlisted men, this can be conducted for only 3 days every 4 years during the "vertical" call-up of derived reserve units. Consequently any real unit training in reserve regiments is out of the question. Moreover, in 1 year of compulsory military service, the army has time merely to give draftees a sort of "khaki veneer" and thus make soldiers of them but not combat troops.

3. Inadequate Weaponry

The best-equipped reserve regiments are armed with the following individual and crew-served weapons: PM MAT 49 [1949 model of submachine gun manufactured by Tulle Armory], FSA 49-56 [1949-1956 model of semi-automatic rifle], AA52 [1952 model of automatic weapon convertible into automatic rifle, light or heavy machine gun], and 73-mm LRAC [antitank rocket launcher]. Other reserve regiments are armed with the MAS 36 [1963 model repeating rifle manufactured by Saint Etienne Armory] and the FM 24-29 [1924-1929 model automatic rifle]. A more serious deficiency is the absence of field and antiaircraft artillery.

Reserve divisions amount to three motorized regiments, each with six 81-mm mortars and six 75-mm recoilless rifles, and one CLB [light armored cavalry] regiment equipped with 36 AML's [light armored car] or thirty-six 106-mm recoilless rifles.

The DIM [Motorized Infantry Division], with its 4,500 men and 1,000 vehicles, is a poorly balanced unit for its assigned tasks. It is certainly too large for countercommando search and destroy operations, but not powerful enough to conduct an open assault in support of the main combat forces.

Deficient weapons are actually but a sign of the uncertainty surrounding missions and tasks to be assigned to this motorized infantry division. It is difficult to conceive its being employed as a "third-category" force with the task of maintaining order in the event of an emergency or crisis.

Only the Mobile Gendarmerie is adequately equipped and trained for such police tasks.

Countercommando Operations

Employing a DIM against infiltrated commandos is tantamount to using a hammer to kill mosquitoes. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the forward deployment of Israeli forces into the Sinai was harassed by helicopter-borne Egyptian commandos. The purpose of these Egyptian tactics was to hold the maximum number of Israeli troops in static defense positions along Israeli axes of deployment. The Israelis very quickly realized what the Egyptians were trying to do. So to counter the commandos, the Israelis used only small groups of specially trained soldiers, from the Border Police, a paramilitary organization. These small groups operated in columns with vehicles equipped like those of the World War II SAS (Special Air Service): Dodges [3/4-ton trucks] or halftracks with heavily reinforced antimine floors, protective rollbars in case the vehicle turned over, long-range radios, etc. Each column consisted of a command vehicle, an 81-mm mortar carrier, a vehicle with an automatic 20-mm gun, plus three, four, or five personnel carriers armed with 12.7-mm or 7.62-mm machine guns. These groups of six to eight vehicles with their considerable firepower were enough to destroy the Egyptian commandos one after another. They were the most cost-effective units in the entire war.

As a means of countering airborne or amphibious operations, the DIM is not comparable in size with, for example, a Soviet airborne regiment. The French infantry regiment of 940 men has six 75-mm recoilless rifles and six 81-mm mortars. The Soviet airborne battalion has six 82-mm recoilless rifles, three 82-mm mortars, and three twin 23-mm antiaircraft guns for only 340 men.

For the same number of men as the French, the Soviet paratroopers have three times more supporting weapons. This ratio becomes even more unfavorable to the French where Soviet airborne regimental or divisional heavy weapons are concerned.

Let us assume, for illustrative purposes, that an attempt is made to seize a French airfield. Starting from the principle that the DIM has had time to mobilize, we can already expect the skies to be hostile to the division during its deployment.

Even if the front to which it is advancing is far away, the division will encounter marauding enemy aircraft on all routes leading to the combat zone. If the front is nearby, the division may even be attacked by combat helicopters. Yet the division has no antiaircraft weapons with which to protect itself, even if it is operating with a regular army division. It is hard to see how jeeps mounted with 106-mm recoilless rifles firing shaped-charge antitank shells out to a range of 500 meters could pit themselves against 23-mm antiaircraft guns delivering direct fire at a range of 1,000-1,500 meters. During the civil war in Lebanon, Christian Phalangists were never able to approach the Palestinian camp at Tal-al-Zattar as long as the twin 23-mm guns defending it were not destroyed by their heavy artillery. Although AML 90's [light armored car armed with a 90-mm gun] are a match for 85-mm antitank guns, and AML 60's [armed with 60-mm mortar] a match for mortars,

they will all have a difficult time against [Soviet] Sagger antitank missiles--range: 3,000 meters--or 120 mm mortars.

The DIM could serve as infantry reserves for the main combat forces. But the division's lack of supporting arms will inevitably limit it to a "gap-filler" role. Two or three DIM's will be positioned where one single regular infantry division (DI) would have sufficed.

Consequently heavy losses can be expected for very slim results. The current weapons status of the DIM's is such that their capacity to accomplish their missions is doubtful. In an emergency situation, they could be used primarily to display an army presence in regions from which the main combat forces are absent, reassure the civilian population, maintain surveillance of axial routes, etc. In short, they could constitute a sort of mobile territorial security police force. In that case, their present equipment and weapons are much too costly for the sole mission of showing themselves and "beating the drums."

Insisting upon obtaining ultramodern equipment is by no means the answer. Recent wars show that, under certain conditions, slightly renovated equipment can prove to be formidable if it is operated properly. The Israeli Army has never complained about its World War II GMC trucks, halftracks, and Sherman tanks.

The proper approach is to determine what improvements can be made, at tolerable cost, to enhance the effectiveness of DIM's. We can think of a host of possibilities. The 106-mm recoilless rifles mounted on the armored cavalry regiment's jeeps have only shaped-charged shells, the only such projectiles issued to the French Army. Yet there is a high-explosive shell available for this weapon. The firm PRB [Belgian United Gunpowder Factories] regularly produces them. By purchasing these shells, the DIM's 36 recoilless antitank rifles would also become 36 supporting weapons capable of being used against infantry troops. The regular army's vehicle replacement and modernization program could advantageously be used to transfer to reserve units light Marmon 4 x 4 trucks (refitted with diesel engines, if possible) or Berliet Gazelle trucks. During World War II, French armored divisions had Bofors 40-mm AA guns mounted on the rear bed of GMC trucks, a highly effective arrangement. Now that Bofors 40-mm guns are being replaced by Roland [surface-to-air missiles] in corps artillery regiments, why not revert to that solution by having these guns mounted on GMC or Berliet Gazelle trucks?

Proposals for Reserve Forces

France has reached the point where it now has three military systems. The "professional armed forces," half of whose personnel are regulars. The latter constitute a majority in the Strategic Nuclear Forces (FNS), the air force, the navy, the intervention forces, general headquarters and staffs of all three services, etc.

Alongside the professional armed forces there are the "conscript armed forces." Even though conscription is now merely a source of filler personnel for the

air force and navy, the conscript forces still form the bulk of French Army manpower.

Reform of the mobilization system has recently added a third system, "the reserve forces," even though the high command denies this by insisting on the disappearance of the separation between the DOT and the forces of maneuver, on the symbiosis between active and reserve personnel, etc. This third force revives the issue of the future of conscription.

France has never been able to choose between the three systems: whether to establish an all-volunteer and completely professional army, reform its conscription system, or choose a compulsory reserve system as in Switzerland. France's geostrategic position, its missions, and tight budgets preclude this choice. France does not have the resources to do everything. Nevertheless, this is actually what it is doing.

Completely professional, all-volunteer armed forces--as in Great Britain and the United States--tailored to the nuclear age and designed to make nuclear engagement possible, are not conceivable. To obtain a military system equivalent to Great Britain's, France would have to agree to reduce its total military manpower to nearly half its present strength while simultaneously enlisting 100,000 volunteers and slightly increasing its defense budget. Furthermore, a part of French public opinion is politically opposed to professional armed forces.

The latter would do away with the reserves in their present form because there would no longer be reservists trained during compulsory military service. Yet Great Britain has its Territorial Army and the United States its National Guard in which volunteers serve after having left the regular armed forces upon expiration of their term of enlistment, and in which they continue to receive professional training. The Air National Guard in the United States has squadrons of modern combat aircraft--F-4 Phantoms and A-7 Corsairs--plus tankers and transport aircraft. All squadrons are composed entirely of reservists who are not necessarily pilots in civilian life and who upon recall to active duty are assigned missions similar to those of regular U.S. Air Force personnel. A mixed system "professionalizing" the FNS, air force, navy, and the most technical part of the army, and using for the rest of the armed forces a system adapted from the Swiss, Swedish, or Yugoslav model, would not be feasible or credible.

The PS [Socialist Party] plan called for a territorial defense concept derived from the Yugoslav model and recommended by the party's "pro-self-management" wing. Territorial defense would be the responsibility of the People's Mobilization Force (FMP) in which draftees would receive training for an uninterrupted 6-month period. The training would be decentralized at departmental level. This compulsory service would be universal, hence applicable also to women who would have the same rights and obligations as men.

Upon completing their training, men and women would serve in the reserves for several years and be recalled for 2 weeks of active duty training each year

within Basic Military Groups (GMB). These groups of some 30 persons each would be controlled by departmental military authorities in coordination with local communities. The GMB's would maintain a defense in depth that is meant more to materialize the people's will to defend themselves than to conduct combat operations with sophisticated weapons.

This socialist proposal raises a large number of difficulties. It is liable to have us relapse into the situation we were in before the new mobilization plan. As for the number of weapons it would require, there are not 300,000 FSA 49/56 [semi-automatic rifles] in France and there will be no more than 400,000 FAMAS [5.56-mm assault rifle]. Consequently we would have to either manufacture more weapons or deactivate a large number of army units so as to use their weapons.

Establishment of the Territorial Defense system in Yugoslavia delayed modernization of the standing Yugoslav People's Army for several years. It must also be realized that Yugoslav, Swiss, and Swedish geography, with its mountains, lakes, moors, and forests, favors the defenders. Such is not the case with most of France's territory.

The territorial defense system is liable to downgrade the French Army without any compensating effectiveness.

Adoption of the Swiss or Swedish system appears to be just as difficult. There is no additional modern equipment available for issue to skeleton regiments, unless the defense minister intends to reduce the number of active divisions and give their equipment to the reserves. We would also have to establish a personnel category of "semiprofessional reservist," with his military pay pegged to his civilian salary, and provide much more intense training activity spread over a period of several years.

If we apply the principle of equal military obligations for all, service in the reserves will be compulsory. With its 260,000 draftees per year, France would, after merely 5 years, have 1.3 million reservists with operational military obligations. But it would not need them, nor could it arm them, even by using all the weapons in the active forces. In fact, the Swiss organization is designed to compensate for a relatively small population--6 million--which is not the case in France.

Reform of the military service seems inevitable. In this connection, the employment of reserves, as analyzed by us at the beginning of the article, appears warranted and can be improved. Reservists used as reinforcements to give the army its necessary wartime logistic support, could also be given certain combat assignments. During armored combat operations in the Middle East over the past 30 years, and likewise during the Indian-Pakistani wars, it was noted that many vehicles were damaged but repairable, whereas their crews had been decimated. Night-vision devices have increased night-fighting capabilities, but the resistance of troops to fatigue remains unchanged. It would be possible, in such cases, to make maximum use of the army's relatively limited conventional equipment and weapons by providing standby combat troops who would relieve "first-string" troops or serve as replacements for casualties. A conceivable approach would be to keep the best mobilizable

individuals assigned wherever they had performed their compulsory military service. This system would require more rapid, Israeli-style mobilization of these standby troops.

For those derived reserve divisions meant to complement active forces, improvements will of necessity have to focus upon equipment and, above all, upon supporting arms, if we want those units to be effective. Lastly, in the long run, we will have to tackle the problem of compulsory participation by reserve noncommissioned officers and other enlisted men in more intensive training activities.

In the longer run, it is necessary to give serious thought to such matters as the form a conflict in Europe would take, the role of the French Army, and the future of conscription. The resultant reform will have to get to the root of the problems if our defense establishment is to free itself of overwhelming half measures. Such reform will displease a large number of persons because it will necessarily have to interfere with many of our customs and practices. Before giving careful thought to this reform, we must, nevertheless, take cognizance of the French military system's shortcomings.

The term of compulsory military service is too long for the training of ordinary service support personnel. If we want to lower the term to 6 months, then we must accept having the active-duty military obligation fulfilled by frequent compulsory recalls to active duty. On the other hand, the term of compulsory military service is too short for the training and reasonable utilization of qualified combat personnel or technicians. In that case, the term ought to be lengthened to 2 years, but that will double the number of men on active duty.

Any reform clashes with the principle of equal military obligations for all. One solution is a "differentiated" military service, but this approach runs the risk of not having enough long-term volunteers.

Will young Frenchmen accept "differentiated" service with compulsory assignment?

Lastly, the defense budget is generally inadequate. Any financial effort in one sector necessitates sacrifices in others, and the unfortunate thing is that France can hardly afford any deficits.

It is difficult to make a choice. This difficulty explains the current general agreement on the existing system, even though it is acknowledged to have deficiencies.

The only two certainties about the future is that the defense budget will increase and the proportion of volunteers ("professionals") in the armed forces will also gradually increase.

The future reform will boil down to choices on conscription, and hence on the reserves because they are the necessary complement of conscription. That is why this reform interests all of us, us reservists and others.

111th, 127th Infantry Divisions

Paris ARMEE ET DEFENSE in French Jan-Feb 82 pp 20-22

[Descriptive list by Christian Malcros: "French Reserve Forces"]

[Excerpts] 111th Infantry Division

The 111th Infantry Division (DI) is derived from the 111th Airborne (Paratroop) Division (DP). Its commander designate is (reserve) General Christian Marmier. The complete division's first call-up, or full mobilization exercise, was on 8-12 September 1980. With the authorized 15 percent increase, the division was able to meet its personnel requirements with a slight overstrength: officers, 118 percent; noncommissioned officers, 103 percent; other enlisted men, 101 percent. Nearly 3 percent of the personnel recalled had to be removed from the division rolls for medical reasons.

During this call-up, the division conducted Exercise Melusine which was divided into two subordinate field exercises: Caylus held in the departments of Tarn and Tarn-et-Garonne, and Ardour in the departments of Gers and Hautes Pyrenees.

The 111th DI has 300 officers, 700 NCO's, and 3,500 other enlisted men, all reservists. It has approximately 850 vehicles.

It is organized as follows: division headquarters derived from the 11th DP-44th DMT [Territorial Military Division] in Toulouse, 111th RCS [Headquarters and Service Support Regiment] derived from the 14th RPCS [Headquarters and Service Support Paratroop Regiment] in Toulouse, 83d RI [Infantry Regiment] derived from the 9th RCP [Paratroop Chasseurs (Rifle) Regiment] in Pamiers, 34th RI derived from the 6th RPIMA [Marine Infantry Paratroop Regiment] in Mont-de-Marsan, 18th RI derived from the 1st RCP in Pau, 10th RHP [Paratroop Hussars Regiment] in Tarbes, and the 161st CieG [Engineer Company] derived from the 17th RGP [Paratroop Engineer Regiment] in Montauban.

111th Headquarters and Service Support Regiment

Derived from the 14th Headquarters and Service Support Paratroop Regiment stationed in Toulouse.

Commanding officer: Colonel Pierre Sempe.

Composition: headquarters and headquarters company, signal company, transportation platoon, Medical Corps collection section, divisional repair group, and security section.

18th Infantry Regiment

Derived from the 1st Paratroop Chasseurs Regiment stationed in Pau.

Commanding officer: Lieutenant Colonel Claude Chicher.

The 18th RI was assigned to the 111th Infantry Division in December 1978.

161st Engineer Company

Derived from the 17th Paratroop Engineer Regiment Stationed in Montauban.

Commanding officer: Captain Robert Goux.

Composition: headquarters section, combat support section, and three combat platoons.

127th Infantry Division

This reserve division is organized as follows: headquarters derived from the Headquarters, 27th DIA [Alpine Division] in Grenoble, 127th RCS derived from the 27th RCS in Varces, 47th BC [Chasseurs (Rifle) Battalion] derived from the 7th BCA [Alpine Chasseurs Battalion] in Bourg-Saint-Maurice, 53d BC derived from the 13th BCA in Chambery, 67th BC derived from the 27th BCA in Annecy, 13th RC [Chasseurs Regiment] derived from the 4th RC in La Valbonne, and 177th Engineer Company derived from the 4th RG [Engineer Regiment] in La Valbonne.

127th Headquarters and Service Support Regiment

The 127th RCS, derived from the 27th RCS, is stationed in Varces.

The regiment is organized into: a headquarters and headquarters company, transportation platoon, divisional repair company, signal company, Medical Corps collection section, and security section.

4th Chasseurs Battalion

The 47th BC, derived from the 7th Alpine Chasseurs Battalion, is stationed in Bourg-Saint-Maurice.

It was reactivated as a reserve battalion derived from the 7th BCA in 1978.

53d Chasseurs Battalion

The 53d BC, derived from the 13th Alpine Chasseurs Battalion is stationed in Chambery. It was reactivated as a reserve battalion derived from the 13th BCA in 1978.

67th Chasseurs Battalion

Derived from the 27th Alpine Chasseurs Battalion stationed in Annecy.

It was reactivated as a battalion derived from the 27th BCA in 1978.

13th Chasseurs Regiment

Derived from the 4th Chasseurs Regiment stationed in La Valbonne.

It was reactivated as a reserve regiment derived from the 4th RC in 1971.

177th Engineer Company

Derived from the 4th Engineer Regiment stationed in La Valbonne.

Composition: headquarters section, combat support section, and three combat platoons.

109th, 115th Infantry Divisions

Paris ARMEE ET DEFENSE in French Mar-Apr 82 pp 8-11

[Descriptive list by Christian Malcros: "French Reserve Forces"]

[Excerpts] 109th Infantry Division

The 109th Infantry Division is stationed in Saint Malo. It is derived from the 9th Marine Infantry Division, also in Saint Malo, and commanded by General Olleris.

The division held its first full call-up and mobilization exercise in 1979.

The 109th DI is organized as follows: division headquarters, 29th Headquarters and Service Support Regiment derived from the 9th RCS in Dinan, 2d Infantry Regiment derived from the 1st RIMA [Marine Infantry Regiment] in Granville, 62d Infantry Regiment derived from the 3d RIMA in Vannes, 117th Infantry Regiment derived from the 2d RIMA in Auvours, 19th Dragoons Regiment derived from the RICM [Marine Infantry-Tank Regiment] in Vannes, and 159th Engineer Company derived from the 6th Engineer Regiment in Angers.

29th Headquarters and Service Support Regiment

Derived from the 9th Headquarters and Service Support Regiment stationed in Dinan.

Commanding officer: (reserve) Colonel Solard.

Reactivated as the 29th RCS in 1979, inheriting the traditions of the 29th ET [Transportation Company].

117th Infantry Regiment

Derived from the 2d Marine Infantry Regiment stationed in Auvours.

Commanding officer: (reserve) Lieutenant Colonel Daunay.

Reactivated as a reserve unit and assigned to the 109th DI effective 1 January 1979.

159th Engineer Company

Derived from the 6th Engineer Regiment stationed in Angers.

Commanding officer: Captain Voyer.

Constituted and activated 1 January 1979.

115th Infantry Division

Derived from the 15th Infantry Division in Limoges, the 115th DI is commanded by General Moreau.

The call-up of the entire 115th DI--the first such call-up after implementation of the new mobilization plan--was held on 4-9 September 1978 during Exercise Sarigue in the Sarlat region.

Composed of 300 officers, 700 noncommissioned officers, and 3,500 other enlisted men, 85 percent of whom are reservists, the division has 570 vehicles and 760 radios. It is organized as follows: division headquarters derived from the 15th RCS in Limoges, 115th Headquarters and Service Support Regiment derived from the 15th RCS in Limoges, 107th Infantry Regiment derived from the 22d RIMA in Angouleme, 100th Infantry Regiment derived from the 126th RI in Brive, 144th Infantry Regiment derived from the 57th RI in Souge, 9th Chasseurs Regiment derived from the 5th Chasseurs Regiment in Perigueux, 33d Artillery Regiment (RA) derived from the 20th RA in Poitiers, and the 165th Engineer Company derived from the 31st Engineer Regiment (RG) in Castelsarrasin.

115th Headquarters and Service Support Regiment

Derived from the 15th Headquarters and Service Support Regiment stationed in Limoges.

Commanding officer: Lieutenant Colonel Dalm.

Constituted and activated 1 January 1979.

Composition: headquarters and headquarters company, transportation platoon, divisional repair group, signal company, and Medical Corps collection section.

107th Infantry Regiment

Derived from the 22nd Marine Infantry Regiment stationed in Angouleme.

Commanding officer: (reserve) Colonel Couailler.

Reactivated in 1979 as reserve regiment derived from the 22d RIMA.

144th Infantry Regiment

Derived from the 57th Infantry Regiment stationed in Souge.

Commanding officer: (reserve) Colonel Nicholas.

Reactivated in 1978 as reserve regiment derived from 57th RI.

165th Engineer Company

Derived from the 31st Engineer Regiment stationed in Castelsarrasin.

Commanding officer: (reserve) Captain Douladour.

Constituted and activated 1 December 1977.

Composition: combat support section, three combat platoons.

102d,112th Infantry Divisions

Paris ARMEE ET DEFENSE in French May-Jun 82 pp 12-15

[Article by Christian Malcros: "French Reserve Forces"]

[Excerpts] 102d Infantry Division

Derived from the 2d Armored Division in Versaille, the 102d DI is commanded by (reserve) General Schlagdenhauffen.

The division held its call-up, or full mobilization exercise, on 10-15 May 1981 in the department of Eure-et-Loir.

Composed of 270 officers, 670 noncommissioned officers, and 3,400 other enlisted men, 85 percent of whom are reservists, the division is organized as follows: division headquarters, 102d Headquarters and Service Support Regiment derived from the 2d RCS in Satory, 70th Marine Infantry Regiment derived from the RMT [Chad March Regiment] in Montlhery, 93d Infantry Regiment derived from the 5th RI in Beynes, 101st Infantry Regiment derived from 1st RAMA [Marine Artillery Regiment] in Montlhery, 8th Chasseurs Regiment derived from the 6th Cuirassiers [Cavalry] Regiment in Olivet, and 152d Engineer Company derived from the 5th Engineer Regiment in Satory.

70th Infantry Regiment

Derived from the Chad March Regiment stationed in Montlhery.

Reactivated in 1973 as part of the DOT [Territorial Operational Defense].

93d Infantry Regiment

Derived from the 5th Infantry Regiment stationed in Beynes.

Composition: headquarters and service company, reconnaissance and combat support company, and four infantry companies. Strength: 57 officers, 141 NCO's, and 765 other enlisted men.

101st Infantry Regiment

Derived from the 1st Marine Artillery Regiment stationed in Montlhery.

Reactivated as reserve 101st Infantry Regiment in 1968.

8th Chasseurs Regiment

Derived from the 6th Cuirassiers Regiment stationed in Olivet.

Reactivated as reserve 8th Chasseurs Regiment in 1965.

Composition: headquarters and service squadron and three reconnaissance squadrons equipped with jeep-mounted 106-mm recoilless rifles. Strength: 38 officers, 97 NCO's, and 487 other enlisted men.

152d Engineer Company

Derived from the 5th Engineer Regiment stationed in Satory.

Constituted in 1979. Activated by the 5th RG's mobilization section.

112th Infantry Division

This division is derived from the 12th Infantry Division in Rouen.

The entire division was called up on 8-12 September 1981 during Exercise Mangin conducted in the department of Aisne.

Composed of 300 officers, 700 NCO;s, and 3,400 other enlisted men, 85 percent of whom are reservists, the division has 1,000 vehicles, 400 heavy weapons, and 750 radios. It is organized as follows: division headquarters, 112th Headquarters and Service Support Regiment derived from the 12th RCS in Evreux, 128th Infantry Regiment (RI) derived from the 51st RI in Compiegne, 239th Infantry Regiment derived from the 39th RI in Rouen, 243d Infantry Regiment derived from the 43d RI in Lille, 18th Chasseurs Regiment derived from the 7th Chasseurs Regiment in Arras, and 162d Engineer Company derived from the CM [Mobilization Center] No 109 in Tillieres-sur-Avre and sponsored by the 62d Engineer Company of the 71st Engineer Regiment in Oissel.

112th Headquarters and Service Support Regiment

Derived from the 12th RCS stationed in Evreux.

Composition: headquarters and headquarters company, transportation platoon, divisional repair group, signal company, and a Medical Corps collection section. Strength: 550 men and 200 vehicles.

128th Infantry Regiment

Derived from the 51st Infantry Regiment stationed in Compiegne.

Composition: headquarters and service company, four infantry companies, and a reconnaissance and combat support company consisting of the following: antitank section armed with six jeep-mounted 75-mm recoilless rifles, mortar section of six 81-mm mortars, reconnaissance and intelligence section, and an intelligence-liaison section equipped with jeeps and motorcycles. Strength: 1,000 men and 180 vehicles.

239th Infantry Regiment

Derived from the 39th Infantry Regiment stationed in Rouen.

Composition: headquarters and service company, four infantry companies, and a reconnaissance and combat support company consisting of the following: antitank section with six jeep-mounted 75-mm recoilless rifles, mortar section with six 81-mm mortars, reconnaissance and intelligence section, and an intelligence-liaison section.

Strength 1,000 men and 180 vehicles.

243d Infantry Regiment

Derived from the 43d Infantry Regiment stationed in Lille.

Composition: headquarters and service company, four infantry companies, and a reconnaissance and combat support company consisting of the following: antitank section with six 75-mm recoilless rifles, mortar section with six 81-mm mortars, reconnaissance and intelligence section, and an intelligence-liaison section. Strength: 1,000 men and 180 vehicles.

18th Chasseurs Regiment

Derived from the 7th Chasseurs Regiment stationed in Arras.

Composition: headquarters and service squadron, and three reconnaissance squadrons equipped with jeep-mounted 106-mm recoilless rifles. Strength: 650 men and 170 vehicles.

162d Engineer Company

Derived from Mobilization Center No 109 in Tillieres-sur-Avre, it is sponsored for instruction and training by the 62 Engineer Company attached to the 71st Engineer Regiment in Rouen.

Composition: headquarters section, combat support section, and three combat platoons. Strength: 175 men, 40 vehicles, and 15 major items of engineering equipment.

8041

CSO: 3100/918

MILITARY

FRANCE

BRIEFS

VOCAL CONTROL IN AIRCRAFT--It is probably the first time in the world that an experimental vocal-dialogue system has been tested on a combat airplane. Such a system, developed by the Crouzet company, was indeed tested on 5 July on a Mirage IIIR of the CEV [Flight Test Center] of Bretigny. The objective is to make vocal command operational for the future generation of combat planes. The equipment developed by Crouzet comprises the speech recognition and synthesis processor (format 1/2 ATR [expansion unknown] short) and the peripherals associated with it for this experimentation (liquid-crystal visualization box, synthesized-message triggering box, a digital reader/recorder and a tape recorder). The vocal-dialogue processor uses a technique of single-speaker overall recognition of isolated words (capacity: 100 words) and speech synthesis based on the text. In the first phase of the tests, the pilot will use the recognition to call for the principal flight parameters (Mach, speed, altitude, fuel, etc), and the information feedback will be by voice synthesis and visualization in the liquid-crystal box. In the second phase, the pilot will be able to do UHF radio-frequency selection and command trajectory stabilization by voice.
[Text] [Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 15-31 Aug 82 p 15]

11267

CSO: 3100/920

NEW DEFENSE STAFF CHIEF URGES TOUGHER ANTI-SUB MEASURES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Sep 82 p 5

[Article by Anders Hellberg]

[Text] Navy Now Has 10 Anti-Sub Helicopters

The navy currently has 10 heavy helicopters for hunting submarines, seven of them with modern hydrophone equipment. According to Captain Emil Svensson, hunting for a foreign submarine requires having five of these helicopters available.

One must count on one helicopter being in for an overhaul, two are needed for the search to be effective and another two are needed to take their place if the surveillance continues for a longer period of time.

In addition, there is the destroyer, "Halland," but it will be put in mothballs for the indefinite future after the fall maneuvers are over on 1 October. After that no specially-equipped vessels will be available.

The navy has ordered two robot boats of the Spica type, the so-called Ytattack 81, which will be ready in 1985. Another four somewhat larger vessels, Robot-90's, will be produced for use in 1992.

"It would be desirable to step up the purchase of the Robot-90 vessels, so we could have six vessels in all as early as 1986, but it is an economic question," said Emil Svensson.

More helicopters are also high on the list of desired items, since they can move quickly and are best for what is called incident preparedness.

For more simple surveillance of foreign subs, there are also 16 patrol boats now in operation with simple hydrophones, but they are hard to work with since they must lie completely still before the hydrophones can be used. Therefore they can really be used only to guard sea approaches.

Thus the navy can hardly handle more than one foreign submarine at a time if the surveillance is to be intensive.

The situation would be no better in a war, even though the destroyer, "Halland," could be removed from mothballs again in that case.

Sweden Must Step Up Anti-Sub Searches

Sweden runs the risk of experiencing serious pressures from the superpowers unless we step up our search for submarines around the coasts.

"Our capacity for searching for submarines is so low today that the superpowers could say that we cannot take care of our own territory," said Rear Admiral Bror Stefenson, who will become the new chief of the defense staff in October, in an interview with TT.

"The superpowers can put pressure on us and tell us how they want us to do things differently."

Stefenson also said that the money should be redistributed within the defense system so that more is available for submarine reconnaissance.

"The lump sum of 200 million kronor which the government gave OB [Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces] for submarine reconnaissance is not enough.

"I will make a different adjustment among the defense branches in order to get continued funds for hunting submarines," said Stefenson.

The new defense staff chief--a submarine officer from the beginning and a product of the navy--also wants a more differentiated approach to searching for submarines.

He said that the navy should not move out in full force if one person reports a foreign submarine off Waldemarsudde heading for Stockholm harbor:

"It is better if one can make a graduated effort depending on how we evaluate the information. The Swedish people cannot expect us to always move out in full force against reported submarines. We cannot afford it."

U-137 Incident a Good Thing

Stefenson thought it was important for the debate that the Soviet U-137 really ran aground in the Karlskrona archipelago last fall:

"At that point the foreign submarines changed from being a 'UFO problem' to a real problem where people in the armed forces believed us."

By UFO problem, Stefenson means the wealth of reports on alien space ships, which few people really believe in. The counterpart in the armed forces has been the accusations of "budget submarines"--in other words, accusations that the navy has been chasing imaginary subs in order to get better appropriations.

The very fact that navy appropriations have been cut in the last 10-20 years has led to the navy being regarded as a kind of younger brother in the armed forces--squeezed in between the modern, money-hungry air force and the much larger army.

Kajsa Warg

"Today we operate on Kajsa Warg's recipe in submarine surveillance--one takes what one has--when the government decides we are not going to get something," said Stefenson with some bitterness.

The navy does not have much to use in searching for submarines--some patrol and picket boats and a minesweeper or two in addition to the helicopters.

But even though they do not really have the resources, Stefenson wants to introduce at the end of the year the new rules making it possible to use weapons to force foreign submarines to the surface. That possibility does not exist today--even inside the archipelagos, submarines can only be turned away.

The government has decided that the stricter new rules will not apply before 1 July 1983.

"We must use all available means to identify submarines, everything short of killing the crew," said Stefenson.

Airplanes or Daycare

The big ships, such as the destroyers and the frigates, are gone. They were expensive to operate, but had the advantage that they had greater staying power when chasing submarines.

"If they had listened to us in the navy 15 years ago when we warned that we would lose our capacity for chasing submarines along with the destroyers and frigates we would have been in a better situation today," said Stefenson.

Navy leader Per Rudberg has also recently spoken out in favor of using big military ships to hunt submarines.

A naval chief can and should back up the navy, but the new defense staff chief, with his navy past, could have a hard time convincing the chiefs of the other defense branches to stress the navy.

And where will the money come from for bigger ships for submarine surveillance?

Stefenson avoided saying directly that the navy needed big ships more than the army needs new half-tracks or missiles:

"I do not intend to single out either airplanes or daycare centers. The money must be taken in small amounts from various places."

But has the head of the navy really looked into whether more money for submarine surveillance can be found elsewhere in the navy?

"The money must come from the two other service branches or from joint expenses," said Stefenson.

JAS--Cuckoo in the Nest

The question of how to divide up the money among the service branches within the total defense limit is not made less sensitive by the fact that critics of the new JAS combat plane say that the plane will be much more expensive than estimated.

Stefenson is also concerned that the airplane might be the cuckoo in the defense nest that many fear it will be--in other words that it will take more money from the defense budget at the expense of the two other arms of the service.

"With a fixed defense budget limit and a cuckoo--the navy and the army would be pushed right over the edge.

"While I support the JAS, I have to be uneasy, as any Swede would be looking at a 25-billion kronor project. Especially in view of how things have gone economically for previous Swedish and foreign airplane projects," said Stefenson.

Rapid Career

For the fourth time in 6 years, Stefenson is now advancing to a higher step in his career--from chief of the submarine fleet to staff chief in the southern military region, to chief of the coastal fleet and now to chief of the defense staff.

Is it hard to be a top military official sometimes?

"No," said Stefenson, "the hardest thing about being in the military in this country is to constantly shout, 'The wolf is coming.' The problem is that it has been quite a long time since we have seen any wolves."

6578
CSO: 3109/233

GENERAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

IRAQI-HIT SHIP IN IRAN PORT--The Greek freighter Evangelia, 10,800 tons dead-weight, was hit by Iraqi fire in hold No 2 yesterday afternoon while leaving Bandar Khomeyni. The crew, consisting of 14 Greeks and 7 foreigners, abandoned the ship; no one was injured. The seamen are already in a hotel in Bandar (?Bushehr). The ship ran aground 35 miles outside Bandar Khomeyni.
[Text] [NC122140 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 2100 GMT 12 Sep 82]

EURODEPUTY PAPAGEORGIOU DIES--Apostolos Papageorgiou, Progressive Party Euro-deputy, died of a heart attack this evening at the Piraeus Nautical Club reception given by the president of the Chamber of Deputies in honor of the foreign Eurodeputies visiting our country. [Text] [NC092224 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1830 GMT 9 Sep 82]

CSO: 4621/503

GENERAL

SPAIN

BROADCASTING LICENSING POLICY IN BASQUE COUNTRY CRITICIZED

Guipuzcoa EGIN in Spanish 25 Aug 82 p 3

[Article: "Freedom of Expression About To Lose Another Battle"]

[Text] A royal decree of 8 June 1979 and a subsequent Order of 28 August 1980 opened the possibility of creating up to 300 FM broadcasting stations throughout Spain.

What followed was the expected avalanche of applications submitted not only by those groups, political parties and organizations that find themselves excluded from access to the media, but also by the large groups that already control the most important facilities, newspapers, magazines and radio broadcast transmitters. Applications totaled 1,800 for a possible 300 concessions. The avalanche is logical if one considers the low cost of installing an FM broadcasting station: At the reach of all pocketbooks. A 10-kilowatt broadcast can be put into operation for some 10 million pesetas. Or, with the same 10 million pesetas, one can install four 1-kilowatt transmitters in tandem, providing sufficient power to cover the area of Euskadi Sur.

The last Council of Ministers of 1981 awarded the first 120 broadcast station authorizations. This award passed almost unnoticed. Neither the government nor, much less, those whom "luck" had favored had much interest in spreading the news. Discreetness and silence little or no less tried to cover up the names of the groups that will now have their ability to broadcast and propagandize increased.

The PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] initially characterized the concession as "a mockery of freedom, of expression and of the principle of pluralism recognized by the Constitution," denouncing the lack of publicity accorded to the issue and to the fact that the award turned out favoring groups connected with the UCD [Democratic Center Union]. Then, it too joined the corps of the silent.

Ignacio Aguirre, secretary of state for information, stated that this first phase of 120 stations "only contemplates concessions to journalistic and radio broadcast enterprises, in recognition of the current professionalism of the social communications media."

In addition to the FM authorizations granted to the existing radio broadcast networks (13 to SER, 3 to COPE, 12 to Ramon Rato, etc), the newspaper enterprises that found themselves favored on purely political grounds were: EL PAIS with 4 stations (Madrid, Cuenca, Soria and Valladolid); Editorial Catolica (YA) with 3 stations; Antenna 3 Group (ABC, LA VANGUARDIA, INTERVIU, EL PERIODICO and EUROPA PRESS AGENCY) with 23 stations; Prensa Espanola (ABC) with 2 stations (Sevilla and Madrid); CAMBIO 16 and DIARIO 16 with 3 more stations (Madrid, Sevilla and Valencia); and so on for other "provinces" newspapers (EL HERALDO DE ARAGON, EL CORREO DE ANDALUCIA, LA VOZ DE GALICIA, LA VOZ DE AVILES...).

In Catalonia, the Generalitat appealed the decision of the Council of Ministers granting these 120 station authorizations, on grounds of its unconstitutionality. There had been 344 applications submitted to the Generalitat, some of which were also submitted concurrently to the Administration in Madrid. The Constitutional Tribunal found that the Generalitat indeed has the authority to grant radio broadcast station concessions.

In Euskadi

The Basque government, for its part, also appealed on grounds of unconstitutionality, and again the Constitutional Tribunal, in its decision of 8 July 1982, found for the plaintiff.

However, the publishers of EL CORREO ESPANOL-EL PUEBLO VASCO and DIARIO VASCO (3 stations in Vitoria, Bilbao and San Sebastian) and LA GACETA DEL NORTE (Bilbao) had already previously received provisional authorizations, although, here again, the information released was deliberately meager and confused. It seems that no one wants to boast of his good luck. Other authorizations were granted in Pamplona to the Informacion por Ondas enterprise, and in Vitoria to SER.

The criteria applied by the Madrid government are easily understood on the basis of the newspapers that were favored (EL CORREO, LA GACETA and DIARIO VASCO) and on that of those that were excluded (EGIN and DEIA). One cannot anticipate what criteria would have been applied by Ajuriaenea. EGIN submitted its application to the central government and, subsequently, in Gasteiz. Even though the Basque government will appeal the ministerial order of 14 August which converted the provisional authorizations to definitive ones, the final outcome continues doubtful.

EGIN, Freedom of Expression and the FM Authorizations

Once again, the freedom of expression that is being so crowed about has been subjected to a new attack, and of all things at the hands of precisely those who claim to be its most unyielding defenders.

Once again, the process of accumulation of the power of information in the hands of the Right, of the bourgeoisie, goes forward. While access to the means of

informing is, in practice, denied to the popular organizations, owing to the insurmountable difficulty of the massive investments needed to launch a newspaper, a TV station or a radio station--the FM stations, in this case, where the economic barriers could be overcome--the political groups of the Right have made it their business--very legally, to be sure--to deny this small opportunity to EGIN. If until now the airways have been monopolized by the state (RNE), the bourgeoisie (SER) and the Church (COPE), everything from now on will be the same. If anyone has harbored the tiniest hope, if anyone has believed, in the least and for a moment--in the so-called "democratic freedoms," he or she, once again, knows now--and let us hope we have learned now--what to expect. There remains, of course, the possibility that the Basque government's appeals may prosper and that the abuse may be rectified. Should these fail, it will certainly not be for lack of hope.

[Table follows]

The Bosses of Information in Euskadi Sur

<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Enterprise</u>	<u>Proprietors</u>	<u>General Manager</u>	<u>Area Served</u>
EL CORREO ESPAÑOL	Bilbao Editorial S.A.	Javier de Ybarra y Berge, president; Luis Bergareche Mauri, vice president. Directors: Enrique de Areilza Churruca, Lorenzo Villalonga Lacare, Emilio de Ybarra Churruca, Fernan- do de Ybarra Villabaso, Alejandro Echevarria Bus- quets, Juan de Aguirre e Ybarra, Luis M. de Ybarra Zubiria, Miguel Angel Uribe Lastagaray, Juan Antonio de Ybarra Ybarra, Juan L. Ber- gareche Busquets, Javier de Ybarra e Ybarra	Antonio Barrena Ballarin	Vascongadas
EL DIARIO VASCO	S.A. Vascongada de Publicaciones (Some 66.7 percent of the shares are owned by Bilbao Editorial S.A.)	Jose M. Aguirre Gonzalo, honorary president; Luis Bergareche Mauri, president; Javier de Satrustegui, secre- tary. Directors: Emilio M. de Ybarra y Churruca, Alejandro Echevarria Busquets, Luis M. Miguel de Ybarra Zubiria, Miguel Larrea Angel Uribe Lastagaray, Juan Zabalegui Antonio de Ybarra Ybarra, Juan Luis Bergareche Busquets, Luis Ezcurdia Elola, Juan M. Pena Ibanez, Jose Benaran Garcia, Santiago Ybarra Churruca, Jose F. Zaldivar Churumea, Juan Ignacio Mugica	Miguel Larrea Zabalegui	Guipuzcoa
Tribuna Vasca	El Liberal, S.A.	PSOE. Printed on the presses of LA GACETA DEL NORTE.	Eduardo Sotillo Palet	Vizcaya

[Continued on following page]

The Bosses of Information in Euskadi Sur [Continued from preceding page]

<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Enterprise</u>	<u>Proprietors</u>	<u>General Manager</u>	<u>Area Served</u>
DEIA	Iparraguirre, S.A.	Luis Maria Retolaza, chairman of the Board of Directors Miguel Unzueta Uzcanga [as published]; J. M. Gorordo, managing director. Directors: Elias Galdos, Carmelo Renobales, J. M. Guere- barrena Iriarte, Sabino Zubiri Sanchez, Xavier Epalza, Alberto Munarriz Jesus Marticorena [as published], Eduardo Estrada Alda	Felix Garcia Olano	Euskadi
LA GACETA DEL NORTE	Editora Vizcaina S.A.	Stockholders: Ant. Martinez de Olaguibel (15.67 per- cent), Urquijo Olano fami- lies (33.86 percent), Lezama (14.50 percent), Moronati (14.29 percent), Basterra (13.77 percent). Board of Directors: A. Martinez de Olaguibel, president, Carlos Herran Basualdo, secretary; directors: Juan R. Urquijo Olano, Pedro Basterra Basualdo, Ignacio Urquijo Olano, Ramon Moronati, Adolfo de Careaga Fontecha	Alberto Suarez Alba	Vizcaya
NAVARRA HOY	Navarra de Prensa y Comunicaciones S.A.	PNV [Basque National Party]	Alfonso Ventura Vazquez	Navarra

Sources: Enrique Bustamente: "Los amos de la Informacion en Espana" [The Bosses of Information in Spain], Akal Editor, Madrid, March 1982, and EGIN.

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CSO: 3110/228

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